

FOREIGN DEVILS AND BOXERS: A CONCISE HISTORY
OF COMBINED INTEROPERABILITY DURING
THE BOXER REBELLION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

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20001012 015

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

FOREIGN DEVILS AND BOXERS: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE U.S. ARMY'S EXPERIENCE WITH COMBINED INTEROPERABILITY DURING THE BOXER REBELLION IN 1900 by LTC Alan C. Lowe, USA, 116 pages.

This historical case-study investigates and analyzes how the U.S. Army conducted a multinational operation, and to ascertain any legacies the Boxer Rebellion experiences may provide to the way the U.S. Army conducts multinational operations today. This study is limited to an examination of the multinational operation from an interoperability perspective. The international forces in China are analyzed through the specific functions of command, control, coordination, and liaison as articulated in FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*.

The 1900 China Relief Expedition affords an opportunity to reflect upon the U.S. Army's first multinational operation upon entering the twentieth century. The operation was the first opportunity for the Army to join with combined forces in a campaign since French military support provided the decisive edge for victory during the American Revolution. As such, the operation provides a logical starting point when assessing the overall performance of the U.S. Army as it conducted subsequent multinational or combined operations throughout the remainder of the century.

The composition of the international expeditionary forces sent to China in response to the Boxer Rebellion posed significant interoperability challenges for the U.S. Army. Every major world power of the twentieth century participated in this endeavor to rescue their citizens held hostage in Peking by the Boxers. Pitted against the Imperial Chinese Army and the Boxers were forces from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States. Problems such as language differences, coordination, and tactical disparities bedeviled army officers and men.

This study discovered that we have little to learn doctrine-wise from the Boxer Rebellion. FM 100-8 codifies the salient points for multinational operations as identified in this study. Historically, however, this study shows the Army of 1900 to be shallow in its thinking, applying tactical lessons only from their China experience. The Boxer Rebellion was a missed opportunity to learn about coalitions in general; ideas and experience that would be wanting in France, 1918.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a number of people who assisted me in this study. First, I would like to express my appreciation to the members of my committee for the patient attitude they demonstrated to me throughout this endeavor. Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Walt Kretchik, who not only assisted me in the development of the original concept for this study, but also provided invaluable assistance and guidance along the way. Next, my thanks go to Dr. Lewis Bernstein of the Combined Arms Center History office, whose in-depth knowledge of events in China in 1900 was critical to the success of this project. Last, but not least, was Dr. Gary Bjorge of the Combat Studies Institute, who also provided critical advice and counsel to me through the entire writing process. I am fortunate to count these individuals as both colleagues and friend.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not thank my family for their patience, understanding, and most of all the love they expressed to me throughout the many months it took to complete this study. They sacrificed much on my behalf, and for this, I can not begin to thank them enough. Their faith in me was my constant inspiration.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of 7 July some Chinese Christians who were digging a trench came upon an old Anglo-French rifled cannon barrel dating from the 1860 expedition. The gun was removed and cleaned up by a couple of American Marines. By the next day it had been lashed onto a gun carriage supplied by the Italians. The Russian 9pdr. shells were fished out of the well, dried off, and found to fit quite well into the cannon. . . . The cannon received many nicknames, . . . but it seemed that “International Gun” best suited it. After all, it was an Anglo-French barrel on an Italian carriage firing Russian shells and was manned by two American gunners.¹

The quaint account above illustrates one innovative measure taken by the citizens of various nations in the Foreign Legations quarter of Peking while besieged by anti-foreign Chinese known as the Boxers during the summer of 1900. This account also describes the nature of the China Relief Expedition sent to rescue those citizens. Driven by military exigency, this expedition was one of diverse armies lashed together as the cannon above, each piece not quite a proper fit, but coarsely working in concert to achieve a common purpose.

The China Relief Expedition of 1900 affords an interesting example of a multinational operation at the beginning of the twentieth century. In particular, this operation was the first opportunity for the United States Army to participate with combined forces in a campaign since French military support provided the decisive edge for victory during the American Revolution.² As such, this operation provides a logical starting point when assessing the overall performance of the U.S. Army as it conducted subsequent multinational or combined operations throughout this century. From both

World Wars to Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and including the Cold War, the frequency with which the United States conducted coalition operations increased.³ This trend has become routine as the United States moves into the next century.

The composition of the expeditionary forces sent to China in response to the Boxer Rebellion posed significant interoperability challenges for the U.S. Army. Every major world power of the early twentieth century participated in this endeavor to rescue their citizens held hostage in Peking by the Boxers. Pitted against the Imperial Chinese Army and the Boxers were forces from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The majority of these allied countries had a history replete with examples of military alliances and coalitions. The United States possessed no such legacy or recent practical experience to draw upon.

Major General Adna Chaffee, the commander of the American contingent, lacked doctrine to guide him in combined operations, and coalition interoperability was but one challenge that American leadership and forces faced. The American forces that participated in this multinational effort consisted of army, navy, and marine units already on the scene or sent from the Philippines and the United States. The American contingent was an ad hoc task force of small independent units, and Chaffee's staff as such had not worked together.⁴ Thus, there were internal interoperability challenges as well as the problems encountered in the broader context of the American military operating with the other great powers.

The purpose of this thesis is first to investigate and analyze how the U.S. Army conducted this particular multinational operation and second, to ascertain any possible

legacies the Boxer Rebellion experience may provide to the way the U.S. Army conducts multinational operations today. To achieve this purpose this thesis will investigate the ways in which the U.S. Army China Relief Expedition conducted interoperability with other coalition forces. The thesis will also investigate: the doctrine the U.S. Army used in 1900 regarding interoperability with multinational forces; the command and control structure the U.S. Army used to operate with coalition forces; the duties and responsibilities of liaison officers exchanged among the allies; and the ways the U.S. Army resolved the interoperability problems of language and cultural differences. To investigate the above issue this thesis will be in the form of a historical narrative. Current thinking and theoretical concepts on multinational operations from a U.S. Army perspective will provide the overall backdrop for this case study.

In order to conduct this investigation it will be necessary to explain specific terms, set the historical context, and focus on particular aspects of multinational operations for analysis. The scope of this study will be limited to an examination of the operation from an interoperability perspective. Interoperability, as defined in FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, is the reciprocal ability of systems, units, or forces to exchange services and to use those services to operate effectively together (see Glossary). To achieve greater interoperability in a multinational operation, FM 100-8 lists four specific functions as key imperatives. These functions are command, control, coordination, and liaison. These four functions provide the framework for this thesis.⁵

The second chapter of this thesis titled, Current U.S. Multinational Theory and Thinking, examines contemporary U.S. Army (and Joint) theory and thinking on conducting multinational operations. A review of the current state of Joint thinking in the

military becomes pertinent as Army doctrine is “nested” within Joint doctrine; the goal being a common understanding that facilitates service interoperability when executing Joint operations.⁶ Interoperability will be examined using the four key imperatives of command, control, coordination, and liaison to determine how the U.S. Army applies these imperatives in multinational operations. Doctrinal terms are addressed and analyzed to provide a contemporary definition of a multinational operation and of how the United States military views its role in conducting this type of operation.⁷

The third chapter examines the strategic setting in 1900 and describes the relevant political issues and motivations of the primary nations engaged in events in East Asia and their national agendas in China. Also included is the background on events as they occurred in China, including pertinent information on the Boxers, the outbreak of antiforeign violence, and the multinational response.

During the time of the Boxer Rebellion, the great powers of the world sought advantage over one another in Asia. This was the age of both economic imperialism and colonial conquest coupled with a worldwide missionary movement. Terms like “spheres of influence,” “the partition of China,” and “Open Door” were in the common vocabulary of the day, and will be explained in this chapter. It is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss all aspects of the political, diplomatic, economic, and social dimensions of the time. These areas will only be addressed as they relate to ultimate U.S. military involvement in the China Relief Expedition.

The fourth chapter contains an examination of the state of the American army in 1900. This chapter includes a review of doctrine, organization, equipment, sustainment

capability and logistics, as these areas apply to the four key imperatives of interoperability.

In 1900, the U.S. Army recently concluded the Spanish-American War, and although the army had a legacy of Indian fighting on the frontiers of America during the last half of the nineteenth century, it last fought a foreign war in 1848. By 1900, the army was just beginning the process of correcting the deficiencies that the Spanish-American War revealed. Readiness, training, organization, tactics, mobilization, and logistics all were under scrutiny and review. Furthermore, in 1900, the Philippine-American War was an on-going guerrilla struggle; and the army was involved in an overseas colonial expedition. The applicable experiences from both these conflicts are appropriate when addressing disposition, training, experience, and education of the U.S. Army and its leaders.⁸

The fifth chapter entitled, The Combined Military Operation, is a narrative account of the military operations conducted to relieve the besieged legation quarter. Provided in this chapter is a description of the nature of the operations and an examination of the relief campaign in terms of the functions of command, control, coordination, and liaison. The interoperability issues that emerged from this examination are then discussed in light of what might be relevant today.

Although, the purpose of the thesis is not to highlight the political or diplomatic aspect of this particular intervention, it cannot be ignored. The political dynamic of the eight coalition partners using military force to achieve both stated and unstated goals will be addressed, but only in relation as to how they affected the operational effort.

Decisions ranging from choosing an overall commander-in-chief,⁹ to subordination

issues, and in some cases specific instructions regarding soldier conduct were made based on national politics.¹⁰ This “politics of coalition” aspect resulted in many precedents and protocols having to be resolved at the senior leadership level before any cooperative effort could commence, and in some cases determined how an operation would be conducted.

The military operations can be divided into distinct events: the Seymour Relief Column, the Battle for the Taku Forts, the Siege and Battle of Tientsin, and the Siege and Relief of the Peking Legations. Each of these military operations when examined provides a comprehensive picture of the nature of the overall multinational effort.

The final chapter answers the primary and subordinate research questions. Actions of the U.S. Army in China in 1900 are compared to the interoperability tenets and guidance contained in FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*. The degree to which FM 100-8 captures the problems that were part of the China Relief Expedition is examined. Finally, appropriate recommendations are presented to better the understanding of multinational doctrine and to highlight potential topics for further research.

Before beginning, an examination of the China Relief Expedition during the Boxer Rebellion, it is important to construct a framework for comparing past and current multinational concerns. The next chapter will provide that framework by addressing the evolution and development of current multinational doctrine. Furthermore, it addresses the importance of the four functions of command, control, coordination, and liaison in maximizing interoperability among forces.

¹Lynn E. Bodin and Chris Warner, *The Boxer Rebellion* (London: Elite, 1982).

²For a cursory overview of American-French coalition warfare in the American Revolution see Henry Lumpkin, *From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1981); Theodore G. Thayer's *Yorktown, Campaign of Strategic Options* (J. P. Lippincott Co., 1975); Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, vol. 2, 1779-1781 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); and "The Yorktown Stratagem," *Military History Quarterly: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* 8, no.1 (autumn 1995), 8-17.

³Other operations that can be added to the growing list of U.S. combined operations include: Lebanon, 1958, when the U.S. sent Marines and 6,500 Army troops to join forces from France and Great Britain in order to stabilize internal turmoil; Congo, 1964, U.S., Belgian, and Congolese forces participated in a multinational hostage rescue operation; and the Dominican Republic, 1965, when after an attempted coup d'etat U.S. forces were integrated into a combined Inter-American Peace Force comprised of forces from six Latin American nations.

⁴William Crozier, "Some Observations on the Peking Relief Expedition," *North American Review* 172 (1901): 232-237.

⁵Department of the Army, FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997).

⁶Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993); The Joint Staff, Joint Pub 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 10 January 1995); and Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: JCS, 1 February 1995).

⁷See the Glossary provided at the end of this study for pertinent doctrinal terms and definitions.

⁸For additional information on lessons learned and resulting changes from the Spanish-American War and the Philippine War refer to Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), 1998), chapter 4; Perry D. Jamison, *Crossing the Deadly Ground, United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994), chapter 8; Elihu Root, *The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, Addresses and Reports*, Part II (Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1916); and Graham Cosmos, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish-American War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971).

⁹C. F. Waite references numerous sources on the politics of selecting an overall commander: "Russia would not have her troops under an English, Japanese, or American commander in chief. France would not have a British general because of England's poor showing in South Africa. Germany would not have a British general, for one reason because of the failure of Admiral Seymour, and because her emperor was anxious that his own candidate secure the position, . . . and England was opposed to having her troops under any foreign commander, acquiescing (finally) in the selection of Field Marshal von Waldersee," *Some Elements of International Military Cooperation in the Suppression of the 1900 Antiforeign Rising in China with Special Reference to the Forces of the United States* (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1935), 30. For more information regarding the international politics on the selection of von Waldersee as CinC see: Ralph E. Glatfelter's dissertation, "Russia in China: The Russian Reaction to the Boxer Rebellion" (Indiana University, 1975), 91-93. For a brief account of German internal political machinations in the selection of Von Waldersee refer to Martin Kitchen, *The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 92-93.

¹⁰The extreme example of this took place in Germany, when the Kaiser "booted, belted, and helmeted . . . had stood by the waiting ships and harangued his grenadiers. 'When you meet the foe you will defeat him,' . . . No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns, a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Attila, gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German.' John Lord, *Duty, Honor, Empire; The Life and Times of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen* (New York: Random House, 1970), 169. Another example, although not as extreme in tone as the Germans, was nonetheless effective: "The Japanese troops were under instructions to be on their best behavior, as they were to be under the close scrutiny of other powers." Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949), 282.

CHAPTER 2

CURRENT U.S. MULTINATIONAL THEORY AND THINKING

Interoperability, mutual confidence, and success cannot be obtained on the brink of a conflict, nor can they be achieved by a sudden and improvised effort. Good intentions cannot replace professional preparations.¹

Commander Juan Carlos Neves, Argentine Navy

Political and military necessities are the essential factors that drive nations to form alliances or coalitions to achieve a desired end when unilateral action may be ineffective or inappropriate. Although alliances and coalitions are multinational, they are not identical.² An alliance is a formal arrangement between nations pursuing broad, long-term objectives of common interest. Conversely, coalitions between nations form through informal agreements on an ad hoc basis to facilitate common action to achieve a specific purpose.³

Historically, multinational operations conducted by alliances or coalitions are not new.⁴ What is new is the recent doctrinal emphasis placed on these types of operations by the United States military and specifically, the U.S. Army. The army's attempt at codifying how to fight multinationally is outlined in FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*. This chapter explains the recent emphasis the U.S. Army placed on developing a warfighting doctrine for multinational operations. Additionally, this chapter addresses why the army deems the interoperability factors of command, control, coordination, and liaison as essential imperatives.⁵

The roots of FM 100-8 lie in the momentous shift in the security environment of the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

These events were the catalyst for significant changes within the U.S. military. They encompassed not only force structure issues, funding levels, and acquisition of equipment, but also affected doctrinal thinking and development. For an understanding of how Joint and Army doctrine developed in response to shifts in the security environment and of why multinational operations received an increased doctrinal emphasis, it is necessary to review recent U.S. national security strategies. This review assists in explaining the addition of FM 100-8 to the army's family of manuals in 1997.

Upon analyzing previous U.S. national security strategies, several trends emerge as part of the response to the changing security environment. Before 1989 and the fall of the Soviet empire, the security strategy of the United States was somewhat "static" when viewed within the context of the Cold War. The primary security objective was a grand strategy of containment in which deterrence became the focal point. Deterrence sought to counter the communist threat, specifically the Soviet Union. Intrinsically linked to countering this threat was support to the NATO alliance. Support to NATO became a critical linchpin of U.S. strategy, and the defense agenda centered on keeping the alliance strong, responsive, and effective.⁶

Rapid changes in the security environment after 1989, then again post-1991, resulted in reactive changes to the corresponding National Security Strategies. The first phase of the transition occurred between the fall of the Soviet empire and the Gulf War. The national security strategy of 1990 was highlighted by "uncertainty" which reflected the character of the period. Deterrence, however, remained the cornerstone of defense priorities, especially in preventing nuclear war. This was in large measure due to the looming uncertainty of potential Soviet political instability. Although deterrence

remained the dominant factor, other potential threats to national security began to emerge. In addition to deterring both nuclear and conventional war, the National Defense agenda included subjects like chemical weapons, activities in space, and drug trafficking.⁷ The emphasis placed on these areas was larger than addressed previously and stated in terms independent of a threat linked to any specific state. The U.S. now struggled with a greater diversity of threats and the role the military played in countering those threats while the security strategies were attempting to keep pace.

One characteristic of the 1990 national security strategy was the emphasis placed on alliances. The role of NATO remained prominent, but fostering relationships and strengthening all alliances through collective defense arrangements and burden sharing became an important theme. It is interesting to note that “alliance” is the terminology used throughout this particular security strategy, while the term “coalition” was absent. A possible conclusion drawn from this is that the United States clearly saw collective security manifested in terms of formal alliances. In uncertain times the only certainty might be a strong, mature, allied relationship, one developed over time and based on shared values and common interests. The assumption was that the U.S. in all probability would fight future conflicts through alliances. Operation Desert Storm changed things.

The Gulf War demonstrated how uncertain the world had become and how coalition warfare was a very real proposition in future contingencies. This concept was reflected in the 1991 version of the *National Security Strategy*, which stated:

As in the Gulf, we may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include not only traditional allies but also nations with whom we do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral outlook.⁸

Security through cooperation on a regional basis was given more attention because as the strategy explicitly stated, “regional crises are the predominate military threat we will face in the future.”⁹ So, while accomplishment of national security objectives through strong alliances was still emphasized, it was also recognized that the accomplishment of this “end” might well be through the “means” of a coalition.

Another result of the immediate post-Desert Storm security strategy was the new emphasis placed on the role of the United Nations (UN). Specific military support to the UN was not addressed, rather support to strengthen the UN role as an effective international organization became the context of the new security strategy. The UN became the “legitimizing” factor to the international community for U.S. actions against Iraq. Rhetoric emphasizing continued support to UN efforts now served the national interest. The intent of this new emphasis was to ensure future political cohesiveness in response to aggression, but subsequently it became the catalyst for increased U.S. involvement in numerous coalition efforts under its auspices.

Over the next five years the security strategy of the United States changed from “collective engagement” (1993) to one of “engagement and enlargement” (1994-1996). A new regional defense strategy announced in the 1993 version called for improvements in conducting coalition operations. In 1994, enhancing interoperability with coalition partners became another stated goal.¹⁰ The perceived role of the UN also evolved in the context of the strategy. The U.S. now viewed the UN as the primary vehicle for conducting multinational peace operations. Accordingly, for the first time the *National Security Strategy* addressed the issue of command and control of U.S. forces conducting

multinational operations. The placement of American troops under the control of a “competent UN or allied commander” now became a stated possibility.¹¹

Starting with the 1996 edition of the *National Security Strategy* there was a marked difference in the focus from previous versions. The lines between international issues and domestic problems blurred as nontraditional threats assumed greater significance and priority.¹² The primary focus continued to shift, almost to the extreme, towards countering these nontraditional transnational threats domestically. The role of the UN now became considerably downplayed as the following year's strategy reflected these new security priorities in 1997. The issue of command and control for American forces conducting multinational contingency operations amplified this point. The wording was particularly telling in that it stated, “there may be times when it is in our interest to place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of a competent allied or United Nations commander.”¹³ This was a reversal from previous security strategies, and not only implied atypical command relationship situations for future U.S.-multinational military operations, but also a greater potential for involvement with actors other than those under UN auspices.

Broadly speaking, the national security strategies of the last decade evolved from one dominated by a bipolar reality to one that struggled with greater worldwide uncertainty. These evolutionary changes resulted in an increased emphasis on multi-regional stability based on agreements, organizations, and relationships to ensure collective security and protect national interests. A greater reliance on multinational solutions to resolve security issues became the stated norm.

Likewise, as the *National Security Strategy* of the United States attempted to reflect the rapidly changing security environment, the military also tried to keep pace. From a practical standpoint, as executor of the Defense Agenda portion of the security strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) faced a dual challenge. First, DoD had to adjust to the new priorities caused by the rapid shifts in the security environment. This adjustment resulted in increased global commitments over time. Second, the military had to fulfill these commitments while force levels shrunk and its previously robust forward overseas presence dwindled.¹⁴ The U.S. military leadership soon realized that with the exception of unique circumstances, the days of unilateral military action had ended. The military needed new doctrine regarding the conduct of joint operations in a combined environment in order to address the very challenges it faced.

The capstone manual for Joint doctrine is Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*.¹⁵ This document, published shortly after the Gulf War, provided some broad considerations for combatant commanders when participating in multinational endeavors.¹⁶ These broad considerations encompass three themes: relationships based on equality of partnership and mutual respect with the U.S. military serving as a role model for teamwork; enhancing mutual support through capabilities, interoperability, and resources; and the importance for simplicity and clarity when operating in a combined environment.¹⁷ These considerations provided the conceptual framework for conducting multinational operations until the writing of manuals with specific guidelines occurred. Until more definitive doctrine was published, military leaders had little to draw upon for consistent guidance in the multinational arena. They depended upon previous

experiences in combined operations, their sound judgment in the application of the considerations in Joint Pub 1, and historical examples.

The inclusion of detailed multinational guidelines in joint publications began in 1994. The majority of joint manuals published between 1994 and the present either contains substantive statements on multinational operations or has a specific section devoted to these operations.¹⁸ Still, for the most part the areas addressing multinational operations in these manuals tend to be general in nature and strategic in focus, as is characteristic of joint doctrinal publications.¹⁹

Nineteen ninety-four also marked the beginning of the development of the most significant joint manual on multinational operations, Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. Designed to guide joint force commanders, component commanders, and staffs in the planning and execution of multinational operations, this manual was specific in focus and functional in intent.²⁰ It provided doctrine on a multitude of issues, such as multinational command structures, command and control relationships, and interoperability and included a helpful multinational operations checklist to assist commanders.²¹ Not yet officially published, this valuable manual remains but a final coordinating draft. It has languished in final draft status since 1997 because of interservice issues and not over any multinational matters.²² As briefly outlined above and regardless of the publication status of Joint Pub 3-16, significant progress occurred in incorporating multinational operational concerns in joint doctrine in recent years.

At the same time joint doctrinal publications addressed aspects of operating in a combined environment, the U.S. Army began the development of its own service doctrine

to address multinational military issues. Ideally, this service doctrine would be “nested” within existing joint doctrine, and sometimes this was the case. However, the army, assessing its own needs in the absence of definitive joint doctrine on multinational operations, pushed ahead on its own doctrinal efforts.

By 1990, the army had a wealth of multinational experiences from which to draw upon for doctrinal insights. These experiences were a result a formal long-standing alliances. Alliance experiences included fighting and training in World War II, experience with the Combined Forces Korea, and in training with its NATO partners for almost half a century. The interoperability issues and solutions that arose from these experiences became part of standard procedures put in place as these regional alliances matured. The army, however, failed to codify these lessons as part of a doctrinal guide for all to draw upon. Therefore, soldiers and leaders learned the intricacies of multinational operations usually through direct participation alone.

After the coalition experience of Desert Storm and with the rise of UN-supervised peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and in Haiti, the potential for the army to conduct combined operations increased in the 1990s. The army senior leadership realized that they would be called upon to conduct and lead future Joint Task Forces (JTF) in contingency operations. Moreover, the likelihood of these operations consisting of units from many nations was high and these combined JTFs might not necessarily come from existing alliance arrangements, but could be a coalition effort as in Desert Storm. The senior leadership of the army became aware that there was no doctrine to guide commanders and staffs in conducting combined operations.

This new realization on the part of the army became apparent in the 1993 version of FM 100-5, *Operations*, in which an entire chapter was devoted to combined operations.²³ This brief chapter addressed planning considerations when conducting combined operations, but only in a broad sense. Topics like command and control, maneuver, logistics, and intelligence concerns all merited a section in the chapter. Also mentioned were other considerations critical to operating in a combined environment, such as cultural differences, language barriers, building teamwork and trust, and the importance of liaisons with combined staffs.²⁴ Although this chapter was a start at providing some direction to commanders and staffs regarding the complexities of operating in a combined environment, it was inadequate for future anticipated missions.

In 1994, the year that many joint manuals began to address aspects of multinational operations, the army published FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*. This manual was a marked improvement in addressing multinational operations when compared to FM 100-5. It described in breadth the various types of peace operations the army could be involved in, and addressed in-depth the planning factors requiring careful consideration. It incorporated “lessons learned from recent peace operations and existing doctrine to provide a framework” for unilateral operations, UN and non-UN-sponsored operations, as well as interagency and multinational operations.²⁵ The primary chapter in this manual that examined these varied options in executing peace operations was titled “Command, Control, Coordination, and Liaison.”²⁶ Although these functions emerged as key doctrinal imperatives, they were diluted when specifically related to multinational operations because of the grouping of all available lead-type options in one chapter. A critical review would show that the army attempted to cover too much information for too

many complex operations. Instead of breadth, the need was for something more focused specifically on planning and executing multinational operations for the army.

Once the senior leadership of the army decided to develop specific doctrine for multinational operations, the result was dramatic. Published in 1997, FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, filled the doctrinal void left by previous joint and army manuals.²⁷ It was similar to FM 100-23 in that the second chapter is titled “Command, Control, Coordination, and Liaison,” but unlike FM 100-23, this chapter provided the foundation for interoperability issues pertaining exclusively to multinational operations. All other subsequent chapters in FM 100-8 provide the framework for operational and tactical-level planning considerations, such as maneuver, firepower, intelligence, and logistics. Importantly, however, these chapters build upon the interoperability tenets addressed up front in its Chapter 2. The army now had the guidelines in place to assist commanders and staffs in the planning and execution of conducting multinational operations across the spectrum of conflict.

An analysis of the four imperatives of command, control, coordination, and liaison listed in FM 100-8 shows why these functions are essential in achieving interoperability among multinational military partners. However, before examining their importance, a brief discussion about the nature of coalitions is required.

Achieving national aims is the predominant underlying concern for countries in a military coalition. Furthermore, coalition members seldom share national aims. National interests may contribute to suspicion, mistrust, or even cause a coalition to disintegrate. Although common national aims are not a prerequisite for forming a coalition, a military coalition requires an agreed-upon collective aim or common goal to be successful. This

agreement on a common goal is a recurring theme stated in most manuals that mention multinational operations, including FM 100-8. Common goals is the “glue that binds” the multinational force in achievement of collective security ends. Efforts by coalition leaders to harmonize these goals can still be difficult due to disagreements that may arise over the means to attain them.²⁸

Defined in military terms, this common goal or purpose is unity of effort. Based on the complexities of conducting coalition warfare because of differences in allied doctrine, organizations, capabilities, technology, culture, and language, unity of effort becomes the paramount principle for successful military action. Unity of effort takes priority over the principle of unity of command because coalitions can usually work through command issues, but not divergent efforts.²⁹ Unity of effort is based on trust, cooperation, and mutual understanding between the coalition partners, while all share goals and objectives commensurate with their own capabilities. The goal of this cooperation and mutual understanding is to facilitate interoperability among the forces. Simply stated, interoperability allows forces to exchange services enabling them to operate effectively together (see Glossary). As Kenneth Allard stated, “Interoperability must be the key if the unexpected is to be treated as an everyday occurrence.”³⁰

True interoperability among multinational forces is virtually impossible to achieve. The “playing field” among the participants will never be a level one. Dissimilarities naturally exist because of diversity of national histories, cultures, and languages. Couple these factors with varied organizations, procedures, doctrines, capabilities, and asymmetrical technologies, and the challenges to interoperability become tremendous.³¹ However difficult the degree of interoperability becomes to

achieve levels of harmonization, unity of effort comes by working within the framework of the tenets of command, control, coordination, and liaison.

Command: FM 100-8 states, “The basic purpose of the MNF (multinational force) command is to direct the military effort to reach a common objective.” Normally in a coalition one of two command structure models are used: parallel or lead-nation. In a parallel command structure a single MNF commander is not designated. Each nation retains control of its own national forces. Consequently, a parallel command structure consists of a dual headquarters and could possibly have more. Coalition partners coordinate formally through the planning process, informally through a staff coordination center, and with liaisons officers. In a coalition, parallel command is usually the starting point for a command structure as it is the easiest structure to establish and becomes the structure of choice due to political concerns. In the lead-nation command structure, one commander is designated as the MNF commander. The MNF commander is normally selected from the nation that provides the bulk of the forces for the operation. Other participating militaries provide liaisons and staff augmentations to the lead-nation headquarters as required while the MNF commander works in close cooperation with the other nation's military commanders. A lead-nation command structure arrangement is preferred over the parallel command structure because it adheres to the principle of unity of command and lends to a more rapid operations tempo.³²

As a fundamental principle of warfare, unity of command in combined warfare is probably the most difficult to obtain. For one nation to relinquish control of its forces to another country's command authority in war is a rare act of supreme trust and confidence. Even if a lead-nation command structure is chosen, it is important to note that this does

not necessarily imply full authority over other coalition forces and that national command lines will never be completely severed. Consequently, the successful MNF commander knows when to be accommodating or persuasive and how to balance political concerns with military necessity.³³ Thus, consensus becomes an important aspect of the decision-making process in these types of operations.

In sum, true unity of command in coalition operations is virtually impossible to achieve mostly due to political concerns. Regardless of political or national command issues, coalition leaders strive to keep the command structure as simple and direct as a practical matter.³⁴ This effort alone will alleviate confusion and friction within the coalition. In addition to simplicity, the MNF commander strengthens his command position by building trust, confidence, and understanding within the coalition. The best substitute for a less-than-authoritative command situation is emphasis on unity of effort. Unity of effort will strengthen the coalition and may in fact add to the coalition image that a strong command environment exists. However, unity of effort remains an effective method to channel coalition forces to achieve objectives only as long as the perception of the threat remains strong.

Control: Politically speaking, most nations operate on the premise they will never relinquish total command authority of their forces to another nation's military commander. National command authority lines, whether stated or not, are a political reality, and assumed as inviolate. The commander's challenge in a multinational operation is to clearly understand the point "where political structure ends and military structure begins."³⁵

Simply stated, control is the equivalent of “rules of engagement” for military command authority. The concept of control establishes the command and control (C2) authority parameters that govern the operational use of forces. In a multinational operation, it becomes important that senior commanders agree on the type of C2 authority and relationships allowed. These parameters must be established early in the formation process of the coalition. Because each nation's military may have differing definitions of command relationships, an understanding of control definitions becomes critical to avoid misconceptions over the appropriate uses and responsibilities of supporting forces conducting operations.

Clearly defined and understood reporting channels and chains of command in a multinational force helps to avoid mistrust and suspicions among members. In a long-standing alliance, such as NATO, formalized C2 relationships are developed, practiced, and refined over time. All members understand the C2 limits imposed, and the advantages to operational applications. In a coalition, C2 “rules” must be learned quickly and are critical in streamlining operational efficiency, avoiding unfulfilled expectations, and facilitating coordination.³⁶

Coordination: The challenge of getting large forces to work in concert requires a high degree of coordination. In modern military operations, the coordination difficulties encountered in integrating and synchronizing aspects of joint warfare pose problems even for experienced planners. In modern coalitions the coordination challenges of joint warfare remain, but with the added dimension and complexity of additional national armed forces and with each force bringing its own peculiar style of warfare to the table.³⁷

Effective coordination becomes critical when differences in language, organization, technology, and capabilities are added. To improve coordination and enhance interoperability among varied forces with different capabilities, FM 100-8 lists several ad hoc structures based on Desert Storm lessons, which may assist. These ad hoc structures include military coordination centers when no real command structure exists for multinational-staff coordination and use of coalition support teams that provide training, intelligence, and communications linkages with coalition units.³⁸ The key to planning, coordinating, and executing coalition operations is staff integration and commander-to-commander relationships. Regardless of the coordination method employed in a coalition, liaison personnel play an essential role in the process.

Liaison: Coalition forces communicate with one another by two methods: by technical connectivity and through personal and professional relationships.³⁹ Regardless of the level of technical communications compatibility between forces, the interaction and relationships liaison officers provide are essential to the success of multinational operations. The language barriers, cultural differences, and national perspectives found in coalitions transcend equipment interoperability concerns and can impede mission accomplishment. At best, these impediments can slow coalition actions, and at worst, they may cause a coalition to disintegrate.

Liaison requirements need to be anticipated early in the planning process. These requirements should be reciprocal in that all participating nations provide liaison counterparts to the fullest extent possible. The primary requirement for a good liaison officer is tactical and technical professional ability. Ideally, liaison personnel should also speak the language of the country they are working with and should have some sense of

that country's cultural and historical background. In the absence of language skills, interpreters will be required to ease communications.⁴⁰

If liaison officers do their job correctly they reinforce over time reciprocal trust and confidence. Without effective liaison, executing the other three imperatives of command, control, and coordination becomes more difficult. "The antidote to the fog and friction of coalition warfare is not technology; it lies in trusted subordinates who can deal effectively with coalition counterparts."⁴¹

Overall, coalitions by their nature are inefficient organizations replete with numerous inherent obstacles that can cause failure in the accomplishment of the collective goal it was formed to achieve. Stated another way, in a coalition, the whole is usually "less than the sum of all the parts."⁴² Taken together, the effect of the four imperatives listed in FM 100-8 assists in overcoming the inherent problems of operating in a multinational environment. These imperatives contribute immeasurably to overall coalition interoperability and ultimately increase efficiency, save time, and allow the major focus to remain on the military objective.

Briefly summarized, this chapter has shown the evolution of current U.S. Army theory and thinking relating to multinational operations over the last decade. A review of the developments in recent national security strategies in the post-Cold War era provided the context for the U.S. military's shift from a bipolar focus to one addressing multilateral regional contingencies. Next, an overview of the growth of both Joint and army service doctrine addressing multinational operations showed that the most significant developments regarding doctrinal manuals occurred at a time when the army leadership assessed the need was greatest in this regard. Once doctrine developed, this chapter

further explained the four imperatives of command, control, coordination, and liaison and how these imperatives facilitate interoperability among coalition forces. Additionally, to a limited degree, this chapter provided insight into the nature of coalitions and the challenges of conducting coalition warfare.

In chapter five these four imperatives will be used to gauge the performance of the U.S. Army during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. However, before evaluating the performance of American forces in China, a brief review of the strategic setting at the time is in order. The following chapter addresses events in Asia and on the world scene that precipitated U.S. action in China.

¹Field Manual (FM) 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 3-0.

²Wayne A. Silkett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (summer 1993): 74-85.

³Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (The Joint Staff, 10 June 1998).

⁴For a brief historical listing of multinational operations see: FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, November, 1997), vi; Wayne A. Skillet, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* (summer, 1993): 75; and Thomas J. Marshall, Phillip Kaiser, and John Kessmeire, eds., *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, (Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, December 1997), 1-2.

⁵FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 2-1 to 2-21.

⁶The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C., January 1988).

⁷The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C., March 1990).

⁸The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C. August 1991), 13.

⁹Ibid., 28.

¹⁰The *National Security Strategy* of 1994 (p.8) states, “Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate with other nations,” and further, “Facilitate regional integration, since nations that may not be willing to work together in our absence may be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis.” A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington D.C., July 1994).

¹¹Beginning with the 1994 *National Security Strategy* (p.13) the issue of command and control of U.S. troops is addressed. It is “framed” within the context of historical examples to illustrate previous precedents when U.S. forces were placed under temporary operational control of a foreign command. The security strategy also states, “under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his command authority over U.S. forces.” The historical examples remain in the command and control paragraph through the 1997 version of the security strategy. In the 1998 version, the historical examples are no longer given.

¹²The White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* (Washington, D.C., February 1996), 1 and 2.

¹³The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (Washington, D.C., May 1999), 12.

¹⁴Jay M. Vittori, “Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (spring 1998): 109.

¹⁵Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (The Joint Staff, 10 January 1995).

¹⁶Combatant commander is defined as, “a commander in chief of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President.” JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (The Joint Staff, 10 June 1998), 85.

¹⁷Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (The Joint Staff, 10 January 1995).

¹⁸For a detailed discussion on the development and recent trends on Joint doctrine as it relates to multinational operations see: Jay M. Vittori’s article, “Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine,” in *Joint Force Quarterly* (spring 1998):109-115.

¹⁹Examples include: JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 11 August 1994; JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 10 January 1995; JP 2-0, *Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations*, 5 May 1995; JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995; JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995; JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, 13 April 1995; and the Joint Warfighting Center publication, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, 16 June 1997.

²⁰Jay M. Vittori, "Making the Case for Multinational Military Doctrine," *Joint Force Quarterly* (spring 1998), 110.

²¹Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Final Coordinating Draft, 2 September 1997.

²²Vittori, 110-111.

²³The preceding edition to the 1993 version of FM 100-5, published in 1986 only had a section of six pages that briefly addressed considerations when operating in a combined environment.

²⁴FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), Chapter 5.

²⁵FM 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994), iii.

²⁶Ibid., 20.

²⁷It is interesting to note that in the preface of FM 100-8 (p. iv) it states that the manual "blends the key points of Joint Pub 3-16 into its approach to ensure consideration by Army elements of a joint force." What is interesting about that statement is that JP 3-16 was still in draft form and not officially published. It can only be inferred from this that when the army drafted FM 100-8 it had anticipated that JP 3-16 would predate the publication date of FM 100-8 in November of 1997.

²⁸See JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 11 August 1994, p. I-10; JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995, p. VI-2; and Wayne A. Silkett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (summer 1993), 79.

²⁹JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 11 August 1994, I-10.

³⁰C. Kenneth Allard, *Command, Control, and the Common Defense* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 251.

³¹Silkett says in a footnote to his article, “Too much should not be expected of coalitions. After all, two organizations as fundamentally similar as the US Army and US Marine Corps have not always achieved suitable harmony and cooperation in combat.” He then lists examples of this from World Wars I and II and makes mention of the fact that similar problems existed between both organizations in Korea and Vietnam. Wayne A. Silkett, “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (summer 1993): 84.

³²FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 2-1 to 2-4.

³³For additional discussions about the characteristics needed in a successful coalition commander and command and control issues see Robert W. Riscassi’s article, “Principles for Coalition Warfare,” in *Joint Force Quarterly* (summer 1993): 58-71; and Wayne A. Silkett’s article “Alliance and Coalition Warfare,” in *Parameters* 23, no. 2 (summer 1993): 74-85.

³⁴A good example of how U.S. political concerns resulted in a less-than-simple chain of command occurred during the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia. “However, during the UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) there were three de facto chains of command, namely, the United Nations, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Special Operations Command. . . .the arrangements reflected the need to keep U.S. forces far removed from the reality or appearance of direct UN command,” and again, “If it takes more than ten seconds to explain the command arrangements, they probably won’t work.” C. Kenneth Allard, “Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (summer, 1998): 57.

³⁵FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 2-7.

³⁶Ibid., 2-7 to 2-14.

³⁷Robert W. Riscassi, “Principles for Coalition Warfare,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (summer 1993): 59.

³⁸FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 2-18 to 2-20.

³⁹Scales, 190.

⁴⁰FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operation* (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 1997), 2-20.

⁴¹Robert H. Scales, *Future Warfare: Anthology* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College), 198.

⁴²Wayne A. Sillett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* 23, no 2 (summer 1993), 83.

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC SETTING--CHINA 1900

The Boxers had attempted to enter the Belgian Legation. . . . The Belgian Minister, when asked whether, being so far from the other Legations, he was afraid, wittily replied: "Oh, no; you see, we are a neutral country." He forgot that he too was nevertheless a "foreign devil."¹

A. Henry Savage-Landor

China by 1900 was in disarray. While Western societies flourished with political and technological developments starting in the eighteenth century, Chinese society as a whole remained stagnant.² Political, economic, and military decay was pandemic and had been ongoing for years. Politically, a weak and corrupt governmental system developed under the ruling Manchu dynasty and during the reign of the Dowager Empress Tsu Hsi, at the time of the Boxer Rebellion it had become even more so.³ Economically, China was an agrarian society, the vast majority of the country's population was farmers and their families. Although China possessed a merchant class, craftsmen, and limited industry, the economy was anything but solvent.⁴ Compounding the economic situation was a government fiscal crisis in 1897, brought on by the financial burden of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and provincial corruption, which encumbered the already heavily taxed farmer.⁵ Lastly, the resounding defeat of China by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War revealed to the world the weakness of her military. In response to this defeat, China attempted military reforms in 1897-98, and for the most part these efforts failed to reclaim any semblance of military prowess.⁶ By 1898, these political, economic, and military deficiencies contributed to the international view that

China was not only weak, but also incompetent.⁷ In past decades, China had been exploited economically by the European powers, but now in the last years of the nineteenth century, these systemic deficiencies provided the West with seemingly easier opportunities for greater gains.

Historically, the power struggles in Europe were for dominance, maintenance of continental balance, or continuation as a great power. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the competition among European nations assumed global proportions through the new imperialism. Nations fueled by this new imperialism desired increases in territory, revenue, influence, and control. Thus, colonies became the tangible mark of empire. The contest for colonial possessions and markets centered on the remaining unclaimed parts of the world. China became one of the playing fields in this contest. European powers with economic interests in Asia looked for ways to gain an advantage over other nations in China.⁸

Simultaneously with the appetite for greater economic and territorial expansion came the zeal that characterized the missionary movement of the nineteenth century. Resurgence of “religious fervor swept Great Britain and the United States,” and other Western nations. In crusader-like fashion missionaries set out to “conquer” the world.⁹ The world needed to be civilized, and the first step in the civilizing process was to be Christianized. If economic claims to China fulfilled the needs of earthly empires then spiritual claims on Chinese souls fulfilled a greater need, that of the heavenly kingdom.¹⁰

Additionally, one other factor prevalent during this period in history deserves mention, that of social Darwinism. Once a Western nation engaged in imperialistic endeavors, social Darwinism played a role in rationalizing incentives for colonizing and

civilizing less fortunate people. Although not a driving force in and of itself for expansion, social Darwinism ran as an undercurrent to commercial and religious efforts, and solidified the belief inherently in Western minds that these endeavors were benevolent. Western nations could further justify empire building as an altruistic attempt to provide underdeveloped societies the survival skills necessary to progress up the cultural ladder.¹¹ Three factors, one secular, one spiritual, the other scientific, became strong motives for Western countries to take advantage of the opportunities a weak China presented.

The first Western country to make significant progress in exploiting China was Great Britain. Great Britain struggled for about one hundred years, starting in the early eighteenth century, to make trading with China profitable. A trade imbalance existed between China and Britain because of China's refusal to buy English goods in exchange for Chinese tea. This imbalance started to reverse itself near the end of the eighteenth century when the British found a cash crop in Indian-grown opium.¹² By the early nineteenth century, the Imperial Chinese Court was determined to curb the importation of opium because of the destructive effects it had on Chinese society. This stance by the Chinese government led to war with England in 1839 and resulted in a humiliating setback for the Chinese military. With the resulting peace treaty of 1842, the British successfully gained concessions to have selected Chinese coastal cities open to Western trade. This was the beginning of British commercial dominance and most-favored nation trade status over the other Western powers in China, and "changed the course of Asian history." From that point on, foreign presence began to increase in China, and ultimately

spread to the interior as the Chinese lost the ability to limit commercial activities to just the treaty ports (Map 1).¹³

Although encroachment by other Western powers gradually increased, no serious threat existed to the commercial dominance of England in China until the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. The first repercussion resulting from the defeat of China in 1895 was the threat of other powers partitioning China into “spheres of influence.” This threat became a reality in 1897 when Germany, afraid that dismemberment of China would leave them without a share, occupied Kiaochow. This act initiated the scramble for concessions by the other powers into 1898. Each country in a frantic rush for spoils and positional advantage vis-à-vis the other powers, reserved provincial territories for exploitation as China stood powerless to counter. As William J. Duiker observed, “European commercial and political involvement in China thus developed a momentum of its own.”¹⁴

Two significant events resulted from this “battle of the concessions.” First, domestically within China, it hastened a desperate attempt at modernization known as “The Hundred Days of Reform.” Because of indignation over this modernization attempt the Empress Dowager imprisoned the Emperor, reasserted her authority to run the government, and ended the reform movement. The other significant event precipitated by the threatened partitioning of China was the declaration of the Open Door policy by the United States. England, her position of dominance in China now threatened by imperialistic latecomers, could not afford another colonial competitor, “but sorely needed a partner,” endorsed the American initiative.¹⁵

By the time of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Great Britain already involved in the Boer War, with control of South Africa at stake, was initially reluctant to promote international action in China. England could not afford to jeopardize her position in China, nor did she want to get involved in another unpopular conflict as international opinion turned against the British in the Boer War. England feared that the outbreak of the “rebellion” suggested that the final disintegration of China was about to occur and an international military response to the crisis would portend a final partition.¹⁶

As the crisis of the Boxer Rebellion intensified the motives of the other European nations became more obvious. The other Western powers had much to gain from weakening Britain’s most-favored-nation trade position. Most nations involved in China viewed the rebellion as an opportunity to gain greater economic and territorial advantages at England’s expense. Activities on the part of economic rivals overshadowed the activities of the Chinese.¹⁷

France was yet another of the many Western nations seeking a greater positional advantage in the Far East. France’s primary rival in Asia was Great Britain. While traditional animosities between the two countries had lessened by 1900, suspicions between the two nations remained. Competition between France and Britain for the China market, starting around the midnineteenth century was fierce. In fact, France viewed her holdings in Indochina as means to gain access to China’s interior via entry into the southern Chinese provinces. Later, France attempted to carve out a sphere of influence in the provinces along the southern Chinese border. This was primarily in response to British advances in the central and lower Yangtse Valley regions. France saw the advance as an attempt by Great Britain to further divide China and establish

British dominance in the central Yangtse provinces, thus denying further French access to Chinese markets. As the crisis of 1900 developed, both Britain and France believed that dismemberment of the Chinese empire would be counterproductive to their individual interests. Although suspicions remained, both nations during the course of the Boxer Rebellion worked together diplomatically to maintain China's territorial integrity.¹⁸

Although France was a commercial rival in Asia, England's real threat in China was Russia. The Russians began their quest for territory throughout all of northeast China after acquiring several thousand square miles of Chinese territory in 1860. The land granted to Russia was in compensation for mediating a settlement to the Lorchha Arrow Wars (1858-1860). The holdings stimulated Russian desires for more influence and possessions in the East, and in the following decades gradually advanced to other areas in China justifying these advances as part of Russian "manifest destiny." Within a generation, Russia made significant political and economic in-roads in China, and penetrated into Manchuria.¹⁹

The last five years of the nineteenth century were significant years for Russian policy in East Asia. She saw opportunities to become the dominant power in China. Starting in 1895, Russia had been able to consolidate much of her position in Manchuria and north China. In 1896, she received permission to build a trans-Manchurian railroad reaching her outpost in Vladivostock. Following the Chinese-Eastern Railway construction Russia would gain greater territorial, economic, and political concessions in China. Additional Russian expansion began to spill over into the area coveted by Japan, Korea. Russia could now act from a position of relative strength in her relations with China and the other powers.²⁰

From this perceived position of strength, Russia exerted herself diplomatically in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, playing a key role in the post-treaty negotiations. Russian participation in this event was driven by several motives. First, Russian desire to stop a Japanese presence on the Asian mainland was the dominant factor, but she also wanted to avoid dismemberment of China by maintaining the status quo. Additionally, Russia wished to improve her position with the Chinese government, and hopefully, by extension, weaken her chief rival, England.²¹ The Russian position became stronger because of her diplomatic efforts, but was weakened by 1898 with the ensuing scramble for concessions. This event caused a violent shock to the existing balance of power in China, and it intensified Anglo-Russian rivalry for spheres of influence.²²

One diplomatic measure undertaken by the Russians were attempts to convince the Chinese government that Russia was “the true protector of the Chinese against the rapacity of the other imperialist powers.” Since they successfully mediated settlements for China in 1860 and 1895, and signed a “secret treaty” of friendship with China in 1896, they believed they had a special relationship with the Chinese. This became strengthened because of the geographical closeness of the two countries. The Russians continued to develop this theme during the escalating crisis of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. As the Boxer crisis developed, Russia sought to ingratiate herself to the Chinese throne by expressing a desire to help Peking in problems with the other powers. At the same time Russia saw an opportunity to profit from Chinese troubles by solidifying its influence in northeast China (Manchuria).²³

In addition to Russia, Germany was another rival to British attempts at protecting the worldwide distribution of power. In the 1890s, Germany threatened the British

commercial position in China. The primary German threat to England was economic, however, as Germany sought to protect her overseas holdings the German navy began to increase in size. The start of an Anglo-German naval rivalry began to emerge as well. As a latecomer in the race for worldwide possessions, Germany sought coaling stations and colonial territories wherever obtainable. Increased German activities in China could upset the balance of power that Britain had fought so hard to maintain.²⁴

After the Japanese victory over China in 1895, Germany joined Russia and France in a diplomatic effort to stop Japan's seizure of Chinese territory. This act, known as the Triple Intervention, served several German aims. It provided a way for Germany to keep Russia focused and occupied in Asia, reducing Russian "pressure" on Germany in Europe. Furthermore, with the accession of Nicholas II as czar, Germany looked for ways to improve goodwill with the Russians. This diplomatic effort appeared to be one way for this to be accomplished. Finally, the German government sought to avoid any serious modifications to the status quo in China. Any change could affect Germany's growing commercial ambitions, force her into an alliance with Britain, or leave her empty handed in China.²⁵

Germany, as a reward for her diplomatic efforts, petitioned the court in Peking for a concession to establish a naval base in China. Germany believed justified in the request, and cited the fact that all the major powers had naval bases in East Asia. The Chinese government denied the request. Then, in 1897, after the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung, Germany seized the opportunity to act and took Kiaochow. Germany achieved by force what diplomats denied. The race to dismember China began.²⁶

On the pretext of protecting China from the Germans, the Russians seized two ports, Port Arthur and Dairen. The battle for concessions now began in earnest. Britain, France, and Japan acquired territorial concessions that could be developed into national spheres of influence. Only Italy failed to gain any concessions as the Chinese government showed rare resolve and rejected the request. Besides Italy, the only other country not to gain territorial concessions in China was the United States. The United States, preoccupied by events in Cuba and the Philippines, did not seek concessions.²⁷

Like the United States, Japan also recently emerged on the international scene as a fledgling world power. The Sino-Japanese War made Japan a regional power.²⁸ Unlike China, Japan modernized her society, and this modernization process accelerated after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. As a result, Japan became militarily, politically, and economically strong. This modernization effort provided Japan with the ability to defeat the Chinese in 1894-95, and the capability to do it quickly.²⁹

For years, Japan's main strategic concern was Korea, which heightened with increased Russian interests on the peninsula. Korea, due to its geographic position, provided a corridor of attack to Japan by either Russia or China. Conversely, Korea also provided the Japanese with the same corridor for any potential attack they wished to pursue against Russia or China. The Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) brought Korea under *de facto* Japanese control, and temporarily halted Russian advances in the area. Although, the Japanese achieved much in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, they did not assume that their mission was completed.³⁰

After her victory over China, Japan gained a potential ally in Britain. Both Japan and Great Britain wished to forestall future Russian advances in southern Manchuria as

well as in Korea. Mutual cooperation in their opposition to Russia served both nations; cooperation that would continue during the events of the Boxer Rebellion. In fact, during the Boxer Rebellion, “Japan’s policy would be influenced more by Britain than by any other government.”³¹

As the crisis in 1900 escalated and the need to use force became apparent, two issues concerned Japanese diplomacy. The first was the scope of the Japanese military response. Britain wanted Japan to send a sizeable force early on in the crisis. Britain viewed this option as both economical, and because of geographic proximity, Japan could respond faster to developments as they occurred in China. The option of sending a Japanese force quickly to China also undercut unilateral Russian intervention and subsequent gains. Although Japan perceived the logic of the request, and did not want to see Russian armies arrive in north China and Manchuria, there were reservations. The Chinese government urged the Japanese not to intervene, and as Boxer hostilities were anti-western and anti-Christian, they were not anti-Japanese. Furthermore, Japan did not want to be perceived as being overly aggressive in China and potentially causing a multinational response. Regardless of Japanese concerns, the Russians predictably opposed the British proposal. Russia did not oppose Japan sending troops as part of a contingent from all powers, but denied a mandate for any unilateral Japanese action.³²

The second issue concerned the appointment of the allied commander-in-chief for centralized control of the military operations to rescue the Legations. The Japanese had both the senior ranking commander present and provided the largest force for the multinational expedition. By right, the allied commander should have been Japanese.

That the Russians nominated a German for appointment to the position was an insult to the Japanese.³³

If the Sino-Japanese War thrust Japan on the world scene, the Spanish-American War catapulted America into world power status. By the time of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States last foreign war was fifty years prior in Mexico. Now, in the course of defeating Spain in Cuba and the Philippines, the United States “acquired strategic commitments thousands of miles from home and altered the whole distribution of power in the world.” The United States now became involved in the “toil of leviathans.”³⁴

England saw opportunity in this new balance of power. Faced with a decline in naval superiority, the entry of Germany as an economic and military rival, and increasing Russian aggressiveness, she welcomed the chance to garner American support.³⁵ Likewise, the United States was a newcomer to colonial expansion and sought a policy of maintaining status quo arrangements regarding China. By not possessing a sphere of influence, America benefited from trade and diplomatic agreements negotiated by the other powers and the potential dismemberment of China would jeopardize those existing arrangements. Therefore, with a status quo policy stance, America avoided getting involved in entangling foreign alliances. Consequently, Anglo-American relations began to move in a more favorable direction for both nations.³⁶

If England was the primary beneficiary of an American entry in world events, Germany became the main loser. Like the United States, Germany entered in the race for possessions belatedly. If England could be relatively unconcerned with any U.S. territorial gains, Germany could not. Any territorial acquisitions for America meant one

less opportunity for the Reich. Thus, as Anglo-American relations improved, German-American relations took a turn for the worst, and Germany now began to supplant England as America's primary commercial and potential military threat.³⁷

Historically, America held an interest in the China trade. Of all the countries in the Far East, China was the one that Americans found most seductive. China held the promise of huge profits for traders. The United States did not have the advantage of territorial concessions in China, but possessed the advantage of proximity over the European powers. It was far easier to trade with Asia from the West Coast of the United States, than it was to sail from Western Europe. By acquiring the Philippines, trade with China became more alluring. It seemed that the next logical step for the United States would be to participate in the "carving up" of China. Yet, the United States did not rush to do this. Instead, by 1900, America pursued a strategy of informal empire. American moralistic ideals, continuing problems in the Philippines, and the fact that the United States was economically sound without colonies contributed to a distinctly American brand of imperialism. Thus, the principles of free trade and a level playing field for all became the hallmark of America's China policy.³⁸

The principles of free trade and equal access for all were articulated in the Open Door Notes of 1899 and 1900. The Notes promulgated by Secretary of State John Hay in close collaboration with the British were an attempt to stabilize the situation in China by restricting further exploitation by the great powers to their existing spheres of influence.³⁹ The intent of the Notes were to maintain the status quo, and halt further dismemberment of China by the other powers, thus guaranteeing continued U.S. access. The other European powers, except for Great Britain, viewed the Open Door policy as hypocritical

and self-serving on the part of the Americans.⁴⁰ The other powers might have agreed in principle to the Notes, but rejected United States policy on how best to pursue their own goals in China. This being the case, the United States, with no way to enforce the policy, had nothing to lose in the attempt, and hoped for cooperation and compliance to the Notes.⁴¹

Yet, whether or not the other powers complied with the Notes, the Open Door policy did have some value. It forestalled partition of China, and enhanced American prestige in world affairs. Additionally, it became the model for establishing future economic and diplomatic relations in Asia.⁴²

However, by the time the second Open Door Note was released, the Boxer Rebellion was under way. President McKinley, faced with an election, disliked the idea of becoming involved in an international incident. Furthermore, the administration feared that the United States would become forced into an anti-Chinese coalition. Regardless of these concerns, the administration, agreed to join the other powers in providing a force to rescue the beleaguered citizens trapped in the Legation compound in Peking.⁴³

While the powers jockeyed for advantages over one another, domestic turbulence in China increased at an alarming rate during the closing years of the nineteenth century, finding release in many ways. One was through acts of violence directed at foreigners, and in particular Christian missionaries. Antiforeign xenophobia existed since the beginning of foreign penetration in China, and periodically resulted in violence, but now these acts occurred more frequently. By 1900, these acts were no longer mostly antimissionary, but included all things foreign.⁴⁴

When foreign economic power first penetrated China in 1842, several things resulted. Domestic industries of China could not compete in production with the importation of foreign goods. This caused a gradual increase in unemployment, which exacerbated other growing domestic problems. The proliferation of Western commerce had a significant disrupting affect on the Chinese social and economic systems. Another consequence of foreign economic penetration of China was the arrival of large numbers of missionaries.⁴⁵

If Western commerce exerted pressures on China's social and economic order, then the influence of missionaries did as well. Additionally, the missionary presence disrupted the cultural, religious, and to some degree, legal fabric of Chinese society. Missionary activities posed a direct threat to the traditional social status quo in many ways. To the ruling class, the missionary undermined the gentry's "traditional monopoly on social leadership." The missionary established schools that taught dangerous "truths." These truths had the ring of political and social subversiveness. The missionary provided famine relief, a responsibility of the gentry class. The missionaries continually exploited privileged legal status thus challenging the prestige and authority of local officials. Because of these types of direct threats to the established authority that missionary activities posed, the gentry class had the most to lose from Christian influences. For the common people the missionary influence heightened cultural anxieties and superstitious fears. The missionary practiced bizarre rituals--sacraments, and administered strange healing potions--medicines. They preached rejection of ancestor worship--the core value of Chinese culture. They fostered social disharmony and friction in the community by converting others to the Christian religion. Chinese Christians under missionary

authority became exempt from having to bear their share of the costs for local religious celebrations thus increasing the burden on non-Christians. Within this wide chasm of cultural differences that existed between the Chinese and missionaries "it was inevitable that Christianity would be misunderstood and that the most diabolical motives would be attributable to its propagation."⁴⁶

Similarly, missionaries did not go out of their way to endear themselves to the Chinese. Their attitude was perceived as arrogant, and in most cases, this was a correct perception. They disdained Chinese social and cultural beliefs and attempted to supplant them with their own cultural mores. Because of their arrogant behavior and cultural ignorance, missionaries refused to believe that the Chinese people would actively dislike them. All of the above factors contributed to making the missionary's presence the most resented in China.⁴⁷ The only cure it seemed was to drive the missionaries out.

Although the upswing in antiforeign sentiment can be attributed in large measure, to the missionary influence, initially it was the deteriorating social conditions in China that provided the catalyst for future events. Unemployment, banditry, and general economic strife were endemic in many Chinese provinces. Compounding the overall situation were a series of natural disasters, floods and droughts, that caused many areas to become famine-stricken. Crop failures caused a mounting refugee problem. Due to corruption and inefficiency, governmental administrators could not effectively cope with the seemingly insurmountable problems affecting local populations and in many cases chose not to. Lawlessness reigned in these areas. Hunger, poverty, and dissatisfaction were a way of life. Frustrations ran high in many communities, and conditions were ripe for a rebellion.⁴⁸

The surge in domestic problems ultimately contributed to the rapid spread of the of the Boxer movement in 1899 through 1900. The word “Boxer” was the English name given to the Chinese secret society *Yi Ho Tuan*, or the “Righteous and Harmonious Fists” so named because of the boxing style of calisthenics practiced by its members. Like most Chinese secret societies, the direct origins of the movement are shrouded in legend, and are still open to some dispute among China scholars.⁴⁹ Regardless, two points about the society are without dispute. First, the Boxers became an antiforeign and anti-Christian movement. Second, the movement reemerged in the late 1890s in northern China in the Guan County of Shandong province. As Joseph W. Esherick stated, “Guan County can justly be characterized as geographically isolated, politically weak, militarily ill-defended, and with a population increasingly restive.”⁵⁰ These conditions provided an ideal climate for growth of the Boxer movement.

The Boxers drew little attention outside of Guan, and were a local phenomenon as long as their activities were restricted to northwestern Shandong. All this changed with the appointment of a new provincial governor in Shandong in March 1899. The new governor, Yu Hsien, was “notoriously hostile to foreigners, particularly missionaries.” The movement was now officially condoned by the ruling authority, and their activities rapidly became more violent and widespread. The focus of the activities became mostly foreign facilities. Railway stations and missionary compounds were looted and burned, as well as areas where Chinese Christian converts resided.⁵¹

Starting in the spring of 1899, the movement gained a significant following and began a rapid expansion to other areas in China. This can be attributed to a number of factors. The spiritual rituals practiced by the Boxers, and the beliefs in invincibility

against foreign “devils” they preached provided a sense of empowerment to those on the lower end of the social scale. Another factor was the drought that plagued north China in 1899. It resulted in a considerable number of unemployed, young, male farmers possessing a high level of frustration with nothing to do. Additionally, because of the drought, hunger became a reality for most of the population. The Boxers often had food to provide to their followers, usually obtained by way of contributions or taken from the Christian population. Joining the Boxers became one way to avoid starvation. Then there were the anti-Christian and anti-foreign aspects that made the movement attractive. Latent anti-foreign sentiment began to rise to the surface as helplessness over local conditions worsened. Thus, to be an adherent to the cause became an attractive proposition, and once the movement started to spread in size, activities, and geographical area it took on a momentum all its own.⁵²

For the remainder of 1899, the Boxers operated with relative impunity because of Yu Hsien’s patronage and a policy of complacency by the Chinese government. Boxer violence increased with attacks aimed at Chinese Christians. Then, at the end of December, the murder of a British missionary increased foreign interest and alarm in the Boxer movement to a new level.

Boxer attacks continued in the first few months of 1900, still against Chinese Christians. However, with growing anxieties on the part of the foreign population, and the Chinese government’s unwillingness to crush the Boxers and stop the violent outbreaks, some nations called for warships as a protective measure. The ships arrived near Taku in April. By late May, open violence directed against foreigners began with the attack on two British clergymen, and the burning of the railroad station at Fengtai.

These events resulted in dispatching a guard contingent from the ships off Taku for protection. Anti-foreign feelings among the population in and around Peking increased with the news of warships off the coast and the arrival of some 450 troops. Within days of the arrival of the guard contingent the siege of the Peking Legations began.⁵³

In a later chapter, the military operations conducted by the multinational force sent to rescue the foreign citizens besieged in the Legations will be examined, and the U.S. Army's participation will be assessed. However, before the Army's performance can be assessed, we must review the state of the U.S. Army in 1900. How was the army organized? How were its leader's educated, and the soldiers trained? What tactics or doctrine did the army use? How prepared was the army in 1900 to face the challenges it would encounter in China? The answers to these questions will be reviewed and examined in the next chapter.

¹A. Henry Savage-Landor, *China and the Allies*, vol. 2 (London: William Heinemann Publisher, 1901), 43.

²Victor Purcell, *The Boxer Uprising, A Background Study* (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 3.

³Henry Keown-Boyd, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony, A History of the Boxer Uprising in China in the Year 1900* (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 4.

⁴Purcell, 39-40.

⁵Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 170-173.

⁶For additional information on Chinese military reforms during the period see: Ralph L. Powell's *The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895-1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), Chapter 2. Regarding the preparedness of the Chinese army Henry Keown-Boyd in his book, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony*, states, "despite the reforms of 1898 . . . the Chinese army was still one of the least effective in the world. . . . Generally speaking, the troops were badly paid, badly feed, badly housed, badly armed

and badly trained. Above all they had bad officers." Henry Keown-Bowd, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony* (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 32-33.

⁷See Chester C. Tan's *The Boxer Catastrophe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 11; and Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager's *The Growth of the American Republic, 1865-1942*, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), 350.

⁸William J. Duiker states, "By the last decade of the nineteenth century China had become an area where the great powers were confronting each other. . . . China's gradual political and social disintegration seemed to invite foreign intervention, and the race for spheres of influence in China climaxed as the century drew to a close." William J. Duiker, *Cultures in Collision* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 18.

⁹Ibid., 5.

¹⁰Numerous accounts of the missionary movement's impact on Chinese society are available. Most of the sources in the selected bibliography on China during the period either mention or devote whole chapters to the subject. For a concise overview on the subject the reader is referred to the following three sources: Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbanks, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 10, part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 563-573; Joseph W. Esherick's *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 74-95; and William J. Duiker's *Cultures in Collision* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 11-15.

¹¹Duiker, 6; Social Darwinism was the "theory that people and societies, like animals and plants compete for survival and by extension, success in life. Formulated in the late nineteenth century, social Darwinism built on the theory of natural selection as described by British scientist Charles Darwin . . . social Darwinism was employed by some as the philosophical underpinning for imperialism, racism, and unbridled capitalism." Influential proponents of social Darwinism included the British social philosopher, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who "coined the phrase 'survival of the fittest' to describe the competition among human individuals and groups," and American social scientist and economist, William G. Sumner (1840-1910). Source: *Encarta 98 Desk Encyclopedia*, 1996-97, Microsoft Corporation.

¹²By the midnineteenth century British imperial power and prosperity rested on money obtained from opium, cotto, and tea. For further explication on the British opium trade see J. Y. Yong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium, Imperialism and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹³Duiker, 4-5. As a side note Duiker further states that, “Great Britain, since the Opium War, had more citizens in China than all the other European powers combined, and had staked out a zone of commercial domination in the lower Yangtse Valley,” 19.

¹⁴Duiker, 19

¹⁵See *The Boxer Catastrophe* by Chester C. Tan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 11-32; Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 58-59; Denis Twitchett, John K. Fairbanks, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 2, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 113; William J. Duiker, *Cultures in Collision* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 20; and Victor Purcell, *The Boxer Uprising, A Background Study* (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 84-101.

¹⁶David Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914* (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1977), 169.

¹⁷Duiker, 50.

¹⁸Ibid., 50-51.

¹⁹Ibid., 19, 51-53.

²⁰Ralph Edward Glatfelter, “Russia in China, The Russian Reaction to the Boxer Rebellion” (Ph.D. diss., University of Indiana, 1975), 42; and Duiker, 19.

²¹Denis Twitchett, John K. Fairbanks, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 2, part 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 109.

²²Glatfelter, 37-39, 42. Regarding the intensity of the Anglo-Russian rivalry going into 1900, Sumner states that Nicholas II and his ministers had “an undisguised desire to utilize the opportunity of the Boer War for the strengthening of Russia's position against England. . . . It was reluctantly agreed that not much could be immediately undertaken (in this regard), but the alliance with France was revived and directed now in express terms against England.” B. H. Sumner, *Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East, 1880-1914* (Archon Books, Oxford University Press; reprinted 1968), 8.

²³Duiker, 52-53.

²⁴Robert Endicott Osgood, *Ideals and Self Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 59.

²⁵ Twitchett, Fairbanks, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds., vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 109-111; George Nye Steiger, *China and the Occident, The Origin and Development of the Boxer Movement* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), 48, 54-55.

²⁶ *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing 1800-1911*, vol. 2, part 2, Denis Twitchett, John K. Fairbanks, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 112; and Duiker, 20-21.

²⁷ *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing 1800-1911*, vol. 2., part 2, Denis Twitchett, John K. Fairbanks, and Kwang-Ching Liu, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 113. In an interesting side note regarding the German occupation of Shantung, Richard O'Conner in *The Spirit Soldiers* states, "Shantung was rapidly converted into a sort of Oriental Prussia, with *verboten* signs all over the plac. . . . Within a few years Tsing-tao was converted into a Far Eastern Dusseldorf, the most orderly, the neatest, cleanest and least Chinese, the best fortified city in China, and again, "Kaiser Wilhelm, who had a gift for the vivid but unfortunate phrase-making, sent his brother Prince Heinrich to the China Station with a number of warships and the admonition 'If anyone at all should try encroaching on our rights, go at him with a mailed fist'." Richard O'Connor, *The Spirit Soldiers, A Historical Narrative of the Boxer Rebellion* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 9.

²⁸ William P. Bundy, *Two Hundred years of American Foreign Policy* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 100.

²⁹ Glatfelter, 9; Bundy, 99-100; and Keown-Bowd, 15-16.

³⁰ Bundy, 99-100; and Keown-Bowd, 16.

³¹ Bundy, 100; Duiker, 52; and Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 91.

³² Nish, 81-85.

³³ Nish, 88-89. Regarding the appointment of a Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Nish also goes on to say that it would be "unlikely that any European power would have placed its armies under the command of a Japanese general."

³⁴ Osgood, 58.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

³⁶ Army Historical Series, *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1989), 339-340. Regarding the American use of existing foreign treaties in China, Bundy lists several: America "benefited from the

trading concessions exacted by the British from the Chinese in the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. Then, through most-favored nation privileges American missionaries benefited from a French-Chinese treaty providing for toleration of Christianity.” Bundy, 93-94.

³⁷Richard W. Leopold, *The Growth of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 208.

³⁸Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 21. Regarding trade in the far East, despite the lure of potential profits, “American trade with China hovered around one percent and with Japan two percent of total American foreign commerce.” Bundy, 98.

³⁹“The first Open Door note set forth the doctrine of most-favored-nation treatment in the spheres of influence and the leased areas of China. It was sent in the fall of 1899 in the form of identical notes to Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. In March, 1900, Hay announced that he received ‘final and definitive’ acceptances, although all the replies were actually ambiguous. The second circular note, sent in July, 1900, called for the preservation of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity as well as equal trade opportunities. No formal replies were requested.” Osgood, 61.

⁴⁰Regarding interpretations of U.S. motives behind the Open Door notes, a later communist Chinese historian, Hu Sheng wrote after 1949, “Firstly, the Open Door policy, as suggested by the United States, did not mean that the United States was opposed to aggression in China. It only meant that the United States demanded a share of the loot. That is why the United States raised no protest against the ‘spheres of influence’ established by the European powers, but only put forward the principle of ‘equal opportunity’ for all. This meant: ‘I also want to share the privileges you enjoy in China. You get your share, and I get mine. Let’s all get our shares. Let’s continue to recognize the present Chinese Government and enjoy in common all the privileges in China.’ Such was the gist of the Open Door policy.” Purcell, 99-100.

⁴¹Schulzinger, 22-23; Osgood, 61; and *Cambridge History of China*, part 2, 115.

⁴²Morison and Commager, 353. Author’s comment: It is interesting to further note, that despite all the rhetoric about greater economic benefits resulting from trade opportunities with China at the time, China essentially was economically irrelevant for the United States, but it became the diplomatic main effort.

⁴³Duiker, 61-62; CMH: *American Military History*, 340.

⁴⁴Numerous accounts have been written about the rise of antiforeign sentiment during this period in China. The selected bibliography lists many sources where this information can be found. I refer two sources in particular: Paul A. Cohen’s, *History in*

Three Keys (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Joseph W. Esherick's *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

⁴⁵Purcell, 17; and Duiker, 11; Regarding the number of missionaries in China Thomson states that "before the Treaty of Tientsin, in 1858, there were only a handful of Protestants, and not a great many Roman Catholics," but by 1900 this number had increased to about 4,000 with half being Protestant and the other half Catholic. H. C. Thomson, *China and the Powers* (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1902), 243.

⁴⁶Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbanks, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 10, part 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 563-571.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Regarding conditions in China: "Towards the close of the year 1898 there was serious trouble in the northern part of the province of Kiangsu. . . . For two seasons there had been partial failure of the harvest, at time due to lack of rain and at others to floods. Official corruption greatly aggravated the evils experienced, and when famine threatened, the whole country began to be infested . . . with bands of thieves and robbers." Arthur H. Smith, *China in Convulsion*, vol.1 (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1901), 155. Purcell states, "Moreover, especially in the northern provinces, for more than twenty years after 1875, no single year was free from natural catastrophe such as great floods and droughts, with which the administrative resources of the Manchu government were inadequate to cope" (p.17). Tan writes, "In January, 1898, it was reported that 48 counties and districts in Shantung were suffering from famine. . . . What made the situation more unbearable was the corruption and inefficiency with which local authorities handled the relief" (p.34). Esherick says, "By 1898-99, southeastern Shandong began to be affected. Its refugees joined . . . in the annual trek south along the Grand Canal--a route which had become a 'highway of death and misery'" (pp. 174-175). Paul Cohen writes, "A huge refugee problem, created mainly by the flood of 1898 but also by repeated lesser floods going back to 1892, aggravated an already desperate situation" (p. 31).

⁴⁹According to Steiger, the movement existed prior to 1808 when it was suppressed by imperial decree (p.128). Another source puts Boxer origins as far back as the early 1700s. Lynn E. Bodin and Chris Warner, *The Boxer Rebellion: Men at Arms Series* (London: Elite, 1982), 3. Regarding the formation of the organization in the late nineteenth century, Steiger claims that the Boxers were a lawful defensive militia organization (pp.128-146). Most other China scholars disagree with Steiger on this point. See: Tan. (pp.36-43); Esherick. (p.60); and Duiker. (p.39).

⁵⁰Esherick, 137.

⁵¹Cohen, 23, 42; Purcell, 121; and Duiker, 41.

⁵²Cohen, 34-36. Regarding the number of Boxer followers, Savage-Landor, puts the number at 70,000 adherents by the spring of 1900, "with thousands joining daily." A. Henry Savage-Landor, *China and the Allies*, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann Publisher, 1901), 5.

⁵³O'Connor, 17-18; and Cohen, 44-48. Cohen states that "a number of historians have pointed to the decisive importance of the summoning of the legation guards in late May" as the reason that China and the powers were pushed toward war (p. 48).

CHAPTER 4

THE U.S. ARMY IN 1900

We are the most slouchy soldiers in the world.¹

General Adna Chaffee to Secretary of War Root

By 1900, the United States Army was a much different force than it had been on the eve of the Spanish-American War. Its organizational structure was much larger and more complex and the number of soldiers increased dramatically.² It possessed modern arms and equipment and Regular Army troops were generally well trained. Within the span of two years, military preparedness took on new meaning as the army assumed greater commitments than it had just a few years prior. This transformation was due more to unintentional consequences than national foresight. Instead of a plan, the genesis for the army's transformation occurred on the evening of 15 February 1898. That night the battleship *Maine* exploded in Havana harbor.

The sinking of the USS *Maine* sparked the Spanish-American War and heralded a new era for America. With victory over Spain after an eight-month war, the United States acquired overseas possessions and global commitments. The army, called upon to defeat the Spanish foe, was now asked to administer, police, and "civilize" newly acquired territories.³

The resulting changes after the Spanish-American War profoundly affected the army, but other changes that occurred after the Civil War were just as profound, and would determine the army's future character. How change shaped the army that participated in the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 is this chapter's focus.

Since 1812, and for the rest of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the basic organizational and administrative structure of the army remained static. Two separate elements in the War Department existed--“a departmental staff, serving directly under the Secretary of War, and the Army in the field, divided into geographical districts under professional military commanders.”⁴ Because of this structure, unity of command through military chains was nonexistent, and coordination between the Army in the field and the departmental staff elements was ineffective.

The departmental staff was commonly called the General Staff. The General Staff during this period was not the overall planning and coordinating body that later became characteristic of modern general staffs. Rather, it consisted of numerous independent bureaus that were responsible for the majority of army administrative and logistical functions. Each bureau chief worked for and reported directly to the Secretary of War, as his principal staff advisers regarding the specialized function of their respective bureau.

The second element comprising the War Department was the Army in the field, commonly called the line army. At the head of the line army was the Commanding General who also reported directly to the Secretary of War. The army of the line was further organized into tactical units that were stationed at garrison posts located throughout the country. These scattered posts, were grouped first under geographically established divisions or districts, and then under territorial departments for command, control, and administration. In peacetime, the Commanding General’s authority over line units was mostly titular in nature. As a result, command relationships became confused and fragmented above the geographic department level to the Commanding General.⁵

For the thirty-eight years after the end of the Civil War the line army was primarily involved in constabulary duties on the American frontier. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the army was garrisoned at seventy-seven frontier posts, geographically isolated from one another, and usually in units below the regimental level. Tactical operations included small unit patrolling and Indian fighting.⁶

The army's only combat experience during this period was Indian fighting. Considering the problems of coordinating and communicating with units over vast areas, the army suffered remarkably few defeats. Between 1865 and 1898, there were a total of 943 engagements against the Indians. Of these, only a few operations massed up to three or four thousand men.⁷ Field experience in commanding and maneuvering large numbers of troops had all but disappeared since the end of the Civil War.

Although, the number of combat engagements was quantitatively significant and qualitatively successful overall, the army failed to formally codify its Indian fighting experiences into a guiding doctrine. Rather, successful tactics and techniques developed through hard gained experiences became part of the line army's institutional memory that passed to subsequent generations of Indian fighters.⁸ By the late 1880s, any need for an Indian fighting doctrine became moot as the indigenous populations were mostly subdued, and the frontier rapidly closed. The disappearance of the frontier by the 1890s marked the end of the army's domestic constabulary role.

By the 1880s, astute army officers recognized that fighting Indians was about over. Further, many officers believed that the long years of constabulary duty rendered the army ineffective for large-scale (European style) warfare. These officers believed that the primary function of the army in peacetime was to prepare for war. They

envisioned a thoroughly trained, professionally led force in preparedness, if for no other reason, to guarantee survival of the army in the post-frontier age. Such an idea required reforms to make that vision a reality, and many initiatives were introduced in the 1880s and 1890s. Two ideas in particular--a professional education system for the officer corps and increased emphasis on larger unit level training reaped some dividends when the United States went to war in 1898. Deficiencies still existed and more reforms were needed in the future, but the foundation was laid for a modern army focused on conventional warfare.⁹

Attempts aimed at officer education during these decades took many forms. Professional schools for officers were established, the most prominent being The School of the Application for Infantry and Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth. It was envisioned that the school at Fort Leavenworth and other professional schools would become part of a pyramid of postgraduate institutions with the goal of preparing officers for higher levels of duties and responsibilities. Additionally, an army professional association, the Military Service Institution of the United States was formed, and professional journals such as *Cavalry Journal* and the *Journal of the United States Artillery* began publication. Together, the professional association and journals were viewed as a way for officers to supplement their school system studies and exchange ideas. Finally, post commanders were encouraged to establish a post lyceum for their officer corps. The lyceums became forums for officers to debate “doctrinal” concepts and tactics. Through the education system and associated journals, associations and lyceums, the officer corps created an intellectual base to study and debate the art and science of warfare. These intellectual dialogs over warfare were usually focused on conventional force issues and centered on

European concepts of fighting.¹⁰ This focus inculcated the idea among the officer corps that conventional warfare, not Indian fighting, was worth studying. That the army's *raison d' etre* rejected constabulary duties for preparedness against an unknown more professional foe. It also reinforced officers with the idea that the disappearance of the Indian problem made Europe the foe that potentially threatened the existence of the United States.

Training was the other initiative the army emphasized to enhance preparedness and professionalism. Starting in the late 1880s, units periodically assembled for field exercises and maneuvers. In the case of some regiments, this became the first opportunity for them to form as a body in twenty years.¹¹ By the 1890s, tactical field exercises were routine for most units. The exercises allowed commanders to test the use of open-order or close-order formations; a matter of considerable tactical debate. This debate ultimately favored open-order tactical formations, mainly due to improved infantry and artillery weaponry, and created a need for junior officer and NCO initiative. In sum, the exercises served the dual purpose of testing the tactical problem solving abilities of unit commanders and the ability of their soldiers to operate in the field.¹²

Other changes and reforms took place in the last two decades of the nineteenth century to enhance army professionalism. There were administrative reforms to the officer promotion and retirement systems which allowed greater opportunities for advancement. Additionally, a systematic efficiency report system on all officers was instituted in the 1890s to help gauge an officer's professional competence. There were "doctrinal" reforms in the nineties as cavalry, artillery, and infantry tactical manuals were rewritten to reflect new ideas or reinforce proven fighting concepts. Taken as a whole,

the reforms modernized the army somewhat before its confrontation with Spain and subsequent actions in the Philippines and China. A new sense of army professionalism truly emerged.¹³

The efforts at professionalism and training prepared the army for combat in 1898. The saving feature for the army in the war with Spain was “the quality of the small Regular Army, in combat proficiency.”¹⁴ However, for all its recent efforts, there were still some serious deficiencies within the War Department and the line army that warranted correcting. The Spanish-American War exposed these deficiencies.

The army learned many lessons from its experiences in the Spanish-American War, and some affected future operations in China two years later. To conduct land operations against Spain, the United States fielded a corps-sized expeditionary force comprised mostly of Regular Army troops. The war also saw the first time a corps was organized, transported, and conducted campaign operations since the Civil War.¹⁵ The operational challenges associated with an undertaking of this size were tremendous for the army and its senior leaders. Little institutional memory was left from the Civil War for leaders or staffs to draw upon. Even if the lessons of conducting corps size operations were available, there simply was not the time to relearn them before staging in Florida commenced.¹⁶

The main operational problems facing army leaders in this campaign were not tactical, but concerned transportation and logistical support. The War Department General Staff, with its autonomous bureau structure, possessed no large-scale or integrated planning capability. Mobilizing, equipping, and supplying a force of over 200,000 men overloaded the War Department’s abilities to cope adequately with the

situation. Furthermore, the army lacked a mobilization plan, had no recent experience in conducting joint operations with the navy, and lacked sufficient stockpiles of equipment to field and sustain troops. The solutions to these problems were mostly worked through brute force. For example, without a mobilization plan and no joint operational experience, the army muddled through, adjusting to problems as they occurred. American industry saved the War Department by quickly mass-producing essential items such as uniforms and weapons, thus obviating the equipment shortfalls. Because poor planning resulted in hodge-podge logistical support, officers and men of combat units in Florida and later in Cuba had to sort equipment shipments once they arrived. This detracted from the already limited number of staff officers undergoing tactical planning, and took the men from training. The United States to some degree became its own worst enemy, not the Spanish.¹⁷

Some of the same problems that plagued the expedition to Cuba also applied to forces participating in the Philippine campaign but to a lesser degree. Notably, launching U.S. forces from West Coast ports was accomplished with less confusion and difficulty when compared to the operation in Florida. However, for the Philippines, the increased distance involved in shipping from the United States exacerbated supply and sustainment problems. Ground operations in the Philippines also saw a corps deploy from the continental United States, and revealed more tactical level problems than did the conflict in Cuba. This situation was primarily due to two related reasons, the length of the conflict in the Philippines and the changing nature of the war. Initially, the war against Spanish forces in the Philippines lasted from late July 1898, when U.S. forces landed, until December, and was highly successful.¹⁸ However, upon the Spanish defeat, the war

turned into a prolonged counterinsurgency struggle against segments of the Filipino population. The insurgency phase of the war lasted until 1902, and during this phase the army became an occupation force, government administrators, and conducted tactical operations mostly at the small unit level.¹⁹

Although the army was highly successful in combat operations in both theaters of the war, the army suffered inadequacies exposed by experiences in both Cuba and the Philippines. One problem was doctrine. Without doctrine, tactical operations among the three combat arms were poorly integrated. Artillery was underutilized, and when used generally made an inferior showing. Cavalry was too little in number to make a significant contribution. Consequently, the war became an infantryman's fight. Even then, infantry tactics were a hodge-podge of different methods. Infantry tactics used included, frontal assaults, small unit rushes, large unit advances, and firing while advancing, to name but a few examples.²⁰ Tactical standardization did not exist; tactical deviation became the standard. The only tactical principle seemed to be offensive action coupled with aggressive spirit. The fact that the army was tactically successful without this standardization and integration resulted in this deficiency being glossed over.

Another major inadequacy concerning adequate staff officers became glaringly obvious to army commanders early in the conflict. In 1898, the typical regimental headquarters normally had five staff officers assigned, and the typical battalion staff constituted two officers, an adjutant and a commissary/quartermaster officer. Since corps had not been fielded since the Civil War, the staffs that were formed were inadequate for the demands of larger unit operations. Consequently, additional staff officers were taken

from subordinate line units to fulfill staff functions. This occurred in the Spanish-American War, and General Chaffee used this method in China as well.²¹

The staff demands on Chaffee were greater than for commanders in the Spanish-American War for at least three reasons. First, independent units were sent to China and organized there as a mobile force. Second, Chaffee arrived as the appointed American commander without an assigned staff. Third, because of the multinational aspect of the Boxer Rebellion campaign the need for liaison officers existed.²²

Overall, the army made some mistakes and learned from its Spanish-American War experiences. The operational, transportation, supply and logistical sustaining problems exposed by the war were improved over time, but were not fully corrected when the United States deployed to China. By the time of the Boxer Rebellion, however, the army gained a little experience in these areas. The units that participated in the China Relief Expedition would draw upon that experience.

The war with Spain taught army officers how to equip, move, maneuver, feed, and operate larger units, and do it overseas thousands of miles from home. This lesson was learned, but the challenges associated with deploying and sustaining a corps-size force remained. In China, however, some of these challenges were lessened because of an unanticipated consequence of the Spanish-American War--the acquisition of the Philippines.

The most obvious advantage of the Philippines, as it relates to U.S. military actions in China, was of proximity. The advantage of having a sizable force available near China allowed the United States to send one of the larger contingents to the International Relief Force.²³ Most of the China Relief Expeditionary forces came from

Philippine-based units, along with much of the equipment. Additionally, some units trained and conducted operations together for some time, and this fact assisted in the general positive performance of the U.S. Army during the Boxer Rebellion.²⁴

In conclusion, this chapter addressed some of the critical components of education, training, organization, and some doctrinal concerns to gain a clearer picture of the U.S. Army in 1900. The army of 1900 was a product of its past, both of its legacy from the American frontier and the rapid shift to an overseas war against a conventional European power in 1898. The army had to adjust to new challenges during the last few years of the nineteenth century. Although, problems existed, as can be expected in organizations that find themselves in a period of rapid change, the army overcame these problems and succeeded in meeting its challenges. The following chapter examines the results of rapid change, particularly the China Relief Expedition of 1900.

¹Chaffee to Root, 16 April 1901, General Correspondence, Box 15, Elihu Root Papers, Library of Congress.

²Regarding the size of the army at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War: "It (Army) consisted of but 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men." European armies dwarfed the United States in comparison: "In 1898 the Russian army on a peace footing numbered approximately 1,000,000 officers and men; the French army, 602,720; the German army, 580,612; the Austrian army, 349,205; and the British army (the Home army), 173,730." Frederic Louis Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1916), 153.

³"In the treaty of Paris, Spain ceded to the United States the islands of Guam and Puerto Rico and relinquished its claim to Cuba, placing it under American control. Spain also sold the Philippines to the United States for \$20 million." Andrew J. Birtl, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations and Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 99.

⁴James E. Hewes Jr., *From Root to McNamara, Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, Special Studies Series, 1975), 3.

⁵Ibid., 3-4.

⁶Julius J. Jorgensen, "Historical Analysis of the United States Army: 1898 to 1916" (Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1972), 23-24.

⁷For example: "The Gibbon-Terry-Custer-Crook expedition against the Sioux and Cheyenne in 1876 and the long campaign against Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce in 1877." Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), 267-268.

⁸Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations and Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 60.

⁹Birtle, 86-87; and Weigley, 290.

¹⁰Birtle, 87; Weigley, 273-274; and Dennis J. Vetc, *Lessons Learned: A History of U.S. Army Lesson Learning* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1988), 28.

¹¹For example: "the 12th Infantry in 1887 and the 21st Infantry in 1889" formed as a regiment "both for the first time since 1869." Weigley, 290.

¹²Regarding new weapons: Specifically in the case of the infantry the army adopted in 1893 "the Danish .30-caliber Krag-Jorgensen rifle, with a box magazine of five-round capacity, and firing smokeless cartridges" replacing the single-shot model 1873 Springfield rifle. Weigley, 290; One by-product of the new infantry rifle was the increased emphasis the army placed on individual marksmanship. Jamison, in his book does a superb job of describing the role marksmanship played in the army of the 1880s and 1890s. Perry D. Jamison, *Crossing the Deadly Ground, United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994), 54-61.

¹³Weigley, 290-291; and Jamison, 82, 87-90, 99-111, 116.

¹⁴Weigley, 290, 295.

¹⁵Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 128; William C. Harlow, "Logistical Support of the China Relief Expedition" (MMAS thesis, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., 1991), 57-58.

¹⁶Exactly two months passed from the time that a state of war existed on 21 April 1899 until “the first 17,000 troops of General William R. Shafter’s V Corps landed at Daiquiri” on 21 June 1898. Addington, 128.

¹⁷Weigley, 295-305; Addington, 126-128; *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), 322-325; and Ivan Musicant, *The Banana Wars* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1990), 17-18, 25-27.

¹⁸For example, operations in Manila conducted on 13 August 1898 cost the U.S. a total of 17 killed and 105 wounded. Formal surrender ceremonies from the Spanish came the following day. *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), 336.

¹⁹Birtle, 108-139; Jorgensen, 46; and *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), 335-336.

²⁰Birtle, 131-154.

²¹Harlow, 58-60.

²²According to Captain William Crozier, Chaffee’s Ordnance Chief, “other (Allied) forces showed evidence of preparedness and readiness, resulting from the fact that each unit, as well as the general command, was complete with its transportation, drilled auxiliaries and staff assistants, all organized and accustomed to act together; while the American troops had to be sent as small independent units to China, to be there brought into relations with their staff and organized as a mobile force. It was again proved that our staff departments are of inadequate numbers. General Chaffee had to take his Adjutant-General from one of his line regiments, his Inspector-General from another, also his Chief Quartermaster of the expedition as well as other officers for various staff duties; thus robbing the line, as we always do at the time when it can least spare its officers.” And again, “We have no organized staff for purely military purposes disconnected from supply, such as collecting and disseminating information, arranging the details of movements, supervision of the condition of the forces, etc.” William Crozier, “Some Observations on the Peking Relief Expedition,” *The North American Review* 172, no. 237 (1901): 232.

²³The official report, as of 3 August 1900, puts the number of American troops at 2,000, while the Japanese provided the largest force of 10,000, the Russians and the British provided 4,000 and 3,000, respectively. This compares to the French numbers at 800, Germans at 200, and the Austrians and Italians at 100. By 31 August those numbers had been “corrected” to 7,270 Japanese, 3,480 Russians, 2,232 British, and 1,825 U.S. Army troops with 150 marines included in the number. Source: *Extracts from the Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee on Military Operations in China, 1900*, pp. 567-568.

²⁴Regarding the importance of the Philippines to the China Relief Expedition, Crozier states, “What could have been done without the Philippine base, forms a fit subject for reflection, when it is understood that every soldier, every pound of ammunition and supplies, and every wheel of transportation which reached China in time to start on the relief expedition, came from that possession; lacking which, we would have been unable, like the Germans, to render effective co-operation in the relief of our people.” Crozier, 232-233, regarding units that deployed direct to China from the Philippines: “the 9th Infantry and later the 14th Infantry and some artillery units.” More units from the Philippines would be sent later. Other units coming from the United States used Manila as an arrival base before deploying to China. *American Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1989), 341.

CHAPTER 5

COMBINED MILITARY OPERATIONS

I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight allies than to be one of them.¹

Lieutenant General Mark Clark, 1944

This chapter provides an account of the significant events that occurred in China leading to foreign military intervention in 1900. Also discussed will be a brief narrative of the military operations conducted by the international forces dispatched to China to rescue the Peking Legations. Following this narrative, the pertinent aspects of the military operations are examined through the functions of command, control, coordination, and liaison. Finally, the interoperability issues that emerge from this assessment are addressed, and any issues relevant to multinational operations today are explored.

Antiforeign tensions were simmering in areas around Peking since early January 1900. The various ministers of the Western powers, alarmed over the murder of British missionary S. M. Brooks in late December and other acts of violence that continued into the spring, became concerned over the continued safety of their citizens. In this cycle of xenophobic violence, the Western powers placed diplomatic pressure on the Imperial Court to suppress the Boxer movement. The court vacillated over the Boxer issue before but by April, aided by the assistance of "gunboat diplomacy" with a warship buildup off of Taku; the court caved in to pressure. Imperial edicts outlawed the Boxers, but allowed "peaceful associations formed in self-defense." This court action resolved nothing, for it fell short of Western desires to disband the Boxers, and the Boxers interpreted them as a

foreign attempt to bully the court. Antiforeign sentiment rose in response and violent demonstrations increased as the Boxers gained additional support in surrounding areas.²

In late May, the Boxers burned the Fengtai station on the Peking-Tientsin railroad line. Foreigners in Peking now feared their last link to the coast was severed. The burning of the railroad station hastened the decision to call for a contingent of legation guards from the ships off of Taku for protection. These guards, about 450 from various nations, arrived in Peking on 31 May.³

The situation rapidly deteriorated in Peking shortly following the Legation Guards arrival. Boxer attacks were growing in frequency and intensity, but lately the attacks assumed a greater antiforeign tone as well. As a further protection measure to the escalating crisis, the British minister Sir Claude MacDonald sent an urgent request to Admiral Edward Seymour, the commander of the British warships off of Taku, for reinforcements. Seymour's relief column of about 2,000 men failed to reach Peking primarily because of poor planning and Boxer attacks. While Seymour's column advanced and subsequently became bogged down about thirty miles short of Peking, both the Japanese chancellor Sugiyama and the German foreign minister Baron Clemens von Ketteler were killed in two separate attacks. With both these killings and the failure of reinforcements to arrive for protection, the other ministers became convinced that the only safe place in Peking was in the legations quarter of the city. The consolidation of foreign citizens in the legation compound on 21 June marked the beginning of what became known as the "siege of the legations" (Map 4)⁴

When word was received by the various national governments that their threatened citizens in China were de facto captives, an international rescue effort resulted.

Initially, the various nations believed that a force of 40,000 to 60,000 men would be needed to rescue the legations in China. It soon became obvious that a force of this size took time to assemble and might delay the rescue effort in Peking for up to a year. Still, something had to be done, so each nation provided whatever forces they could muster as quickly as possible. Ultimately, the total relief force effort reached about 20,000.⁵

The military operations that international forces conducted can be divided into four distinct stages; the Seymour Relief Column, the Battle for the Taku Forts, the Siege and Battle of Tientsin, and the Siege and Relief of the Peking Legations. If each of these military operations is treated as a phase of one campaign then an examination will provide an inclusive picture of the nature of the combined effort.

The military campaign began on 10 June 1900, when a rescue effort led by Vice Admiral Edward Seymour departed Taku for Tientsin where he assembled the bulk of a 2,000 man international force and continued towards Peking.⁶ Seymour commanded the expedition because he was the senior officer present, but as a naval officer he had little knowledge of land warfare. He planned to take his force from Tientsin to Peking by train, a rail journey that usually took half a day to complete (Map 2). Seymour expected to be in Peking within a day or two and planned accordingly by only carrying rations for three days. The expedition had about 100 miles to traverse through hostile territory on a rail line of uncertain condition. It advanced only about twenty-five miles before encountering badly damaged tracks. It was at this point that misfortune began to plague the expedition. The force proceeded slowly as track repairs were attempted. Three days later the column advanced only as far as the village of An Ting, about thirty miles from Peking. The column halted outside of An Ting because of destroyed track and strong

Boxer resistance. With supplies low, no way to advance, and communications to the rear cut, the expedition disappeared from view for several weeks while it attempted to limp back to Tientsin. After a series of misadventures to reach Tientsin, the expedition captured a Chinese arsenal at Hsiku and resupplied. Seymour decided to hold at Hsiku and sent word to Tientsin for help. Seymour's force was finally rescued on 26 June by a strong contingent sent from Tientsin. "The expedition suffered more than 300 casualties and its mission was uncompleted." Seymour's failed mission meant another expedition would be needed to go to Peking.⁷

The situation worsened throughout the region while Seymour's expedition withdrew. The remaining allied naval commanders in conference at Taku were compelled to take immediate action to seize the forts there to secure the route inland to Tientsin. Strategically, any major operation against Peking required Tientsin as a base. The allies marshaled a force of eight gunboats and two destroyers, and assembled a landing party force of about 900 troops from seven nations to storm the Taku forts (Map 3). Eight gunboats anchored upstream and bombarded the forts on 17 June. Both the bombardment and storming of the forts were successful and secured the way to Tientsin.⁸ The Chinese government considered the seizure of the Taku forts as an act of war and declared war on the allies on 21 June 1900. The allies now faced both Boxer and Imperial Chinese troops in their effort to protect foreign citizens.

Because of the ferocity of Chinese resistance at Taku, the allies realized that to secure Tientsin and subsequently relieve the Peking Legations more men would be required. Alarmed by the escalation of hostilities, the foreign powers resolved to send more troops to China. By the end of June, the international force numbered some 14,000

troops with additional reinforcements on the way.⁹ Tientsin had to be taken before the allies could proceed to Peking.

While the international force was being assembled and in the absence of instructions from their governments, the allied admirals at Taku, in conference, decided to act. They assembled another expedition to relieve and secure the foreign concessions at Tientsin, reestablish contact with Seymour's force, and then prepare to go to Peking. On 23 June this expedition successfully relieved the foreign concessions in Tientsin, and by 26 June it relieved and evacuated Seymour's expedition from Hsiku. However, Tientsin city, occupied by the Chinese army and Boxers, still had to be secured as a base before a move toward Peking could begin.¹⁰

The final relief of Tientsin would take another three weeks mainly due to allied logistical problems. A shortage of tugs and barges created a logistical log jam at Taku. This delayed the final assault on Tientsin until more men, supplies, and artillery could be brought forward. As troops and supplies moved forward an assault on Tientsin was finally decided in an admiral's conference on 12 July.¹¹

The force that relieved Tientsin numbered about 8,000 troops from the Americans, British, French, Germans, Japanese, and Russians. The allied assault, under the command of Russian Vice Admiral Alexiev, faced a force of about 20,000 Imperial Chinese troops and Boxers armed with heavy artillery guns.¹² The allied forces planned a two-pronged attack against the city (Map 5). One attack, a feint, would consist of a Russian force reinforced with French and German contingents. They would circle from the east and northeast to seize Chinese artillery batteries and gain the city's eastern gate. The main attack would come from the south. This force consisted of Japanese, British,

French, Austrian, and U.S. contingents. The attack plan called for the Japanese force to assault the southern gate and gain entrance to the city while the other contingents assisted by attacking the south wall.¹³

The attack began early morning of 13 July with an allied artillery bombardment of the city walls. As the main assault force approached the city they ran into trouble almost immediately. Marshy areas and rice paddies surrounded the southern entrance, and the only approach to the gate was by a narrow causeway over a moat. As the allies approached the city wall they were meet with well-directed fire. The American contingent, receiving no instructions from the British column commander, turned the wrong way during the advance and was exposed to direct fire from the entire south wall. While this occurred, the French began their attack over the causeway and were repelled. Shortly after the assault began it became hopelessly pinned down for the rest of the day.¹⁴

That afternoon in a commander's conference, courses of action were discussed for a new attempt. The agreed upon plan was proposed by the Japanese general Fukushima. The new plan called for the British and the Americans to withdraw from their positions after dark, strengthening the French and Japanese positions in the center, and the blowing of a breach in the wall by Japanese engineers at dawn. This plan along with a renewed attack in the east and north by the Russian and German forces was successful. The allies finally captured Tientsin city on 14 July after bloody fighting and heavy casualties.¹⁵

The fall of Tientsin opened the road to Peking. Meanwhile, the foreign citizens and Chinese Christian converts reached their twenty-fifth day besieged in the Legations quarter of Peking. The Legation contingents, both military and civilian volunteers, were under the nominal command of Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Minister. In effect,

there was no centralized command and control within the Legations. MacDonald could only request assistance and aid from the various national detachments. Defense responsibilities were divided among the contingents with each nationality's guards protecting their "turf" within the Legation compound (Map 4). Cooperation occurred between the different forces, but usually when immediate survival was at stake vice planned collaboration.¹⁶

For three weeks after the fall of Tientsin the allies took advantage of the victory to resupply and rest while additional reinforcements arrived. Delays were caused by formidable logistical problems that faced the allied commanders at Tientsin. A critical shortage of transport animals, unusable railways, and the destruction of dozens of junks for river transport were some of the logistical challenges encountered. By early August, the importation of Japanese coolies and the directed sharing of river boats between forces eased most of these logistical problems. These solutions allowed a sufficient buildup of men and equipment to organize a relief column. On the night of 3 August, in a commander's conference, the strength and makeup of the relief force was finally agreed, and planned to begin its march to Peking the next day.¹⁷

The International Relief Force column left Tientsin on 4 August with a force of about 20,000 troops.¹⁸ The international force was led by British General Alfred Gaselee, as interim commander, while the commander agreed upon by diplomatic negotiations, German Field Marshal Alfred von Waldersee, was enroute to China. Additionally, U.S. Major General Adna Chaffee arrived at the end of July from the United States to assume command of all American land forces.¹⁹

Gaselee's operational concept for the expedition was fairly simple. His intent was to move rapidly and stop only upon encountering resistance. Once resistance occurred he planned to have forces assault through and then continue their rapid advance to Peking. Rear echelon units would be called forward to mop up remaining Chinese forces. Advancing in front of the main column would be reconnaissance units: Japanese cavalry, Cossacks, and Bengal Lancers, whose mission was to locate the enemy.²⁰

The International Relief Force followed the Pei Ho River north from Tientsin, using the river to ferry supplies and replacements. The forces advanced in two supporting columns positioned on both sides of the Pei Ho (Map 6). Initially the American, British, and Japanese contingents advanced along the west bank as the left wing of the column. The Russians and the French, with small contingents of Austrians and Italians represented the right wing, on the east bank. The Germans did not participate.²¹

The first battle occurred the next day on 5 August at Pei Tsang. The left wing of the column (Japanese, British, and U.S.) attacked Chinese positions with artillery fire and bayonet charges. The French and Russian forces on the opposite bank of the river hindered by difficult terrain could not contribute to the fight. The engagement was a success for the allies, but the Japanese suffered the brunt of the losses while British and American losses were minimal.²²

The next day saw another battle at Yang Tsun. This time the British and the American forces led the attack, with support from the Russians and the French. The allies advanced in open-order formations believing that close-order concentration resulted in the heavy Japanese losses the previous day. The allies defeated the Chinese forces and

secured Yang Tsun with fairly light casualties. Significantly, however, during the attack the first major tactical problem between the allies occurred due to a lack of coordination. Misdirected Russian artillery fire resulted in the fratricide of four American soldiers and eleven wounded. The Russians were given the range estimation by the British in yards, but the Russians operated on the metric system and adjusted fire in meters.²³

The expedition continued its march slowed more by the heat than Chinese resistance. By 12 August the columns reached the city of T'ungchow. It was here that they stopped to resupply and organize an assault on Peking. After a series of conferences, the commanders developed a coordinated plan for attack. To dampen some of the ever-present national rivalries the assault force was divided into four columns. Each column simultaneously would attack the four gates in Peking's eastern wall.²⁴

The allies entered Peking on 14 August. The plan for the assault broke down when the Russian contingent began their movement before the agreed-to time. The Russians, in their haste to be the first to plant their flag in Peking, got lost in the dark and attacked the gate designated as the American objective. When the other allies learned of the premature Russian attack, the assault became an uncoordinated race as each contingent tried to beat the others into the capital. Each army moved to catch up and attacked whatever part of the city wall it could find as it maneuvered for position.²⁵ By late afternoon, and with heavy resistance along some parts of the wall and city, the first allied troops arrived at the Legation Quarter. The siege of the Legations ended on 14 August, fifty-five days after it began. An occupation period now began with some isolated mopping-up actions occurring. On 21 September, with an anticlimactic sense of

timing, Field Marshal von Waldersee, the expedition's true Commander in Chief arrived at Taku with the German East Asia Brigade.²⁶

Having provided a broad overview of the multinational operation, the campaign will be analyzed using the four criteria of command, control, coordination, and liaison. The criteria serve to determine if interoperability issues then are still applicable to multinational operations today.

Command: As a general statement, the command structure employed by the International Relief Force was that of parallel command, as defined in chapter 2. No nation was willing to place its forces under the command of another nation. This was due to political sovereignty issues and national concerns, mistrust, or even bias. Even when the later appointment of a unified commander was agreed upon by the various national governments, the role and responsibilities he exercised were titular. Although all the military commanders recognized the utility of a central command, the prerogative for freedom of action remained paramount. Even the United States, with no experience in combined warfare, reserved its right to exercise independent action. For example, General Chaffee was directed by Secretary Hay to cooperate with the other powers as long as it was in the interest of the aims of the United States.²⁷ Regardless, a cooperative spirit among the senior commanders did prevail and the atmosphere of cooperation remained strong as long as they were fighting the Chinese. Because of the absence of a centralized commander, command by council became the norm. Frequent conferences were conducted at the senior level where plans of action were discussed and then decided.²⁸

Although each nation retained command authority over their forces, there was one exception, the Seymour Expedition. Admiral Seymour was chosen by the consensus of the other senior naval officers to attempt a rescue effort. The international forces he led were placed under his command authority. According to Seymour this was done for three reasons:

1. He was the senior officer present, and a head was necessary.
2. The contingents had a common objective.
3. They were all sailors, among whom a certain brotherhood exists.²⁹

In reality, Seymour held nominal command authority, and an examination of his expedition revealed that this authority was loose. Ultimately, Seymour resorted to an agreement among the different national contingents to maintain any semblance of authority. This so-called Lofa Agreement was issued after a Boxer attack on the expedition caused disorder bordering on chaos near the Lofa train station. The agreement defined the responsibilities of subordinate national commanders over their forces, and addressed coordination procedures to keep forces separate in an effort to enhance the survival of the expedition.³⁰

The international force command structure changed near the end of Chinese hostilities. A unified commander-in-chief was appointed, but did not arrive until after the Legations were relieved. With the appointment of a supreme commander, the parallel command structure became a lead-nation structure (see Glossary). However, Field Marshall von Waldersee exercised no real command authority as the notional leader of an expedition that already achieved its military objectives. The appointment of a commander-in-chief became more of a control measure in an attempt to restrain foreign contingents from pursuing independent national objectives in China.³¹

Overall, seniority of rank or numbers of forces a country provided did not determine the command structure and relationships as they evolved within the International Relief Force, though these factors carried influence among commanders. Instead, national concerns and political aims drove the nature of the command structure in China. The command system during the Boxer Rebellion evolved from a parallel command structure to a quasi-lead-nation arrangement under von Waldersee. Command arrangements worked amazingly well for the tactical units to accomplish their missions. One can speculate what might happen if the Chinese were a more formidable foe.

National politics aside and regardless of the command system utilized by coalition commanders, a spirit of cooperation was essential for multinational units to achieve operational objectives. Cooperation resulted in the development of mutual trust and confidence in the abilities of the other forces. This trust and confidence improved over time as long as the resolve of commanders was strong and common goals remained.

Control: Given the nature of the parallel command system employed by the International Relief Force, control measures found in contemporary doctrinal manuals, such as Operational Control (OPCON) and Tactical Control (TACON) were rarely exercised. There were isolated instances when troops of one nationality were placed under the tactical control of a senior officer from another country.³² However, this arrangement occurred infrequently, and on a small scale.

The larger issue regarding control in the Boxer Rebellion campaign related to effective use of control measures. In the absence of a recognized central command authority, control of a force vis-à-vis the other forces conducting operations became critical. Today, added emphasis is placed on controlling actions to ensure the safety of a

force and to enhance mission accomplishment. These measures to some degree, almost become a surrogate command system. Seymour's Lofa Agreement falls into this category as a method to strengthen a weak command structure.

Control at the tactical level was critical. For example, actions during the siege of Tientsin were rather complex as a large array of artillery was used to cover the advance of coordinated assaults from two directions.³³ At one point, a lack of control measures resulted in the fratricide of American troops by Russian artillery at the Battle of Yang Tsun. Probably the greatest example of failed control measures occurred when the Russians prematurely initiated the planned attack on Peking. This action led to a reactive "free-for-all" rush and assault to the Legations compound.³⁴

In this multinational operation, control of the tactical interaction between diverse forces was critical. Control provided a measure of force protection, and enhanced the potential for success. Without proper methods of controlling forces, objectives were lost with potentially disastrous results affecting the entire coalition. Effective coordination was required to alleviate some of the control problems inherent to multinational operations.

Coordination: During the Boxer Rebellion, multinational forces lacked both a centralized command and a higher planning staff. Because there was no centralized planning staff to coordinate the details of complex operations, confusion and lost time periodically resulted. Normally, courses of action were agreed upon at the senior levels, and the operational concept was passed down to subordinates.³⁵ Detailed coordination among national units was worked out at the tactical level, but problems plagued the expedition because of unfamiliarity of each other's capabilities, national biases, and

language barriers. Examples of this included: transportation problems in moving and supplying the forces; the lack of coordination between the British commander and the American unit during the Battle of Tientsin; a German unit prematurely blowing up a bridge thus denying egress for a Russian cavalry unit; and the fratricide incident at Yang Tsun.³⁶ Despite the coordination problems that existed, when it came to major operational engagements such as at Tientsin with the pivoting of a large international force and combat actions along the Pei Ho River on the route to Peking, coordination seemed effective.³⁷

Many of the supply, transportation, communications, and tactical problems experienced by the international force in 1900 could have been avoided or easily overcome by a coordinating or planning staff. The staff could have eased confusion, avoided miscommunications, and shared resources for the collective good.

Liaison: Scant evidence in the historical record existed regarding the exchange of liaison officers among the different national forces in China. There are brief mentions of liaison officers being used in some sources.³⁸ The historical record does show that the majority of liaison functions was usually satisfied by multiple methods. Aides ran messages between allied commanders, interpreters were used when necessary, and observers were assigned to provide detailed reports on other forces. In one instance liaison officers from each nation were specifically used to assist in resolving transportation problems from the port off of Tientsin to the forces deployed further inland.³⁹ General Chaffee on occasion assigned officers to work with other national forces at the higher foreign headquarters. These officers primarily functioned as observers to the foreign armies and provided reports to Chaffee. Whether or not the

officers performed formal liaison duties remains a matter of interpretation in some cases.⁴⁰ One can assume that interaction between officers of different countries occurred and information exchanged akin to a modern liaison function. A greater use of liaisons by all forces might assisted in overall coordination, and possibly precluded some of the more unfortunate incidents from occurring, such as the previously mentioned fratricide. At a minimum, liaisons officers could have provided the vital coordination function that was absent because there was no centralized staff. That Chaffee did not use more liaison officers may be due to a shortage of available officers, the problems posed by a multitude of languages and the lack of doctrine.

Language fluency is a desired skill for a liaison officer to possess, and a brief mention of the how language barriers affected operations in China illustrates this point. The diversity of languages spoken by the different national forces in China posed some significant communications challenges for the expedition leaders. The challenges were overcome to varying degrees by an assortment of methods. Many international officers spoke English, and nearly all understood some French. Even the Japanese commander at the siege of Tientsin communicated with the British General Doward in French. Furthermore, the various senior leaders at conference meetings used interpreters when necessary. Lastly, international bugle calls were adopted to overcome language difficulties between forces on the move.⁴¹ Even with these measures, the lack of communications due to incompatible languages still existed, especially at the regimental level and lower. At times, language difficulties between units of different nationalities caused communications to break down into gestures and bows.⁴² It is unknown how

many combat actions at all levels were affected by the lack of effective communications due to language barriers.

Overall, sufficient numbers of liaison officers remain a necessary ingredient to facilitate coordination between diverse units in either a modern joint environment or a combined operation. Liaisons officers assist in communications between multinational forces, which at best, are always challenging to maintain. Additionally, miscommunications due to a lack of language fluency result in poor coordination and confusion. Language barriers significantly degrade from overall coalition interoperability.

The above examination through the four functional imperatives provided a different picture of the nature of the coalition in China during the Boxer Rebellion than history reported. A picture emerged of a coalition characterized by a weak parallel command system with no integrated higher-level planning staff to assist in control and coordination efforts, as well as poor use of liaison officers. Perhaps General Chaffee captured the interoperability challenges that faced the international contingents best when he said:

The allies labored under the disadvantage of being a polyglot army with difficult systems of supply and drill, and without a single controlling head or a definite plan of operations. In arranging movements requiring the cooperation of several contingents, messages had to pass between the various commanders suggesting plans that might or might not be agreed to.⁴³

As stated in chapter 2, true interoperability remains virtually impossible to achieve in coalition warfare, and the coalition in China in 1900 was no exception. Interoperability during the Boxer Rebellion operations was best achieved through cooperation, but cooperation periodically turned into competition as national interests and

rivalries surfaced.⁴⁴ As a general assessment, some nations worked best with a few countries and less so with the rest. For example, the insular powers (Great Britain, the United States, and Japan) worked well together, while the other continental powers worked better between themselves.⁴⁵ Thus, national interests, rivalries, and biases contributed to a mixed record of cooperation and competition.

¹Wayne A. Silkett, "Alliance and Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* 2, no. 2 (summer 1993):74.

²Esherick states that "by June of 1900 the Boxers were streaming into the national capital by the thousands," 271; and Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 286-287.

³Ibid., 286-287.

⁴In addition to the 450 military guards that were sent from Taku, "the Legation Quarter held about 500 foreign civilians, including 149 women and 79 children, some 3,000 Chinese Christians." Justin F. Gieseck, "Siege by Righteous Fists," in *Military History* (August 1985); and Esherick, 302-303.

⁵Richard O'Connor, *The Spirit Soldiers* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), 219; Justin F. Gieseck, "Siege by Righteous Fists," *Military History* (August 1985), 38; Henry Savage-Landor comments that it would have been impossible for a relief of Peking to occur when Tientsin and Taku would be frozen over in winter, and any rescue would have had to wait until the following spring or summer. A. Henry Savage-Landor, *China and the Allies*, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann Publisher, 1901), 4.

⁶Seymour's Relief Column was comprised of just over 2,100 men. The day after he departed Tientsin (11 June 1900) he was joined by other small contingents of foreign detachments bringing his total force up to 2,157: "916 British, 540 Germans, 312 Russians, 158 French, 112 Americans, 54 Japanese, 40 Italians and 25 Austrians." Jesse D. Cope, "American Troops in China--Their Mission," *Cavalry Journal* 40 (March-April 1931), 26.

⁷J. K. Taussig, "Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 51 (April 1927): 403-420; and Lewis Bernstein, "Coalition Behavior in the China Relief Expedition," summer 1900. Unpublished paper in possession of the author, 4-5.

⁸Bernstein, 6.

⁹Expected reinforcements would bring this total to about 20,000 troops. This number was still deemed inadequate for an advance on Peking, and was considered barely sufficient to hold the base from Taku to Tientsin. “An advance on Peking could not be effected until further contingents were sent for, and it was calculated that at least a month would pass before it could be possible to start to the relief of the besieged Legations in Peking.” A. Henry Savage-Landor, *China and the Allies*, vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann Publisher, 1901), 163.

¹⁰Bernstein, 7-8; and Benjamin R. Beede, ed., *The War of 1898, and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 540.

¹¹Beede, 540.

¹²An example of how overall command was decided, and command relationships formed is telling in the following account, “On 12 July, the acting allied commander, Vice Admiral Alexiev, governor-general of the Russian Far East, summoned a conference to decide where to attack the walled city. Alexiev was not the most senior general, only the most senior officer. As an admiral and governor, he knew very little of how to assault a fortress. In fact, the commander of the largest contingent was the Japanese General Yamaguchi. With much to lose, he should have commanded the assault. However, the Russians refused to serve under a Japanese.” Bernstein, 9.

¹³Beede, 541.

¹⁴Bernstein, 10-11.

¹⁵Beede, 542.

¹⁶For a first-hand account regarding cooperation among the Legation citizens and forces see: Bertram Simpson’s (B. L. Putnam Weale) *Indiscreet Letters from Peking* (New York: Arno Press, reproduced, 1970); and Bernstein, 13-14. Regarding the selection of Sir Claude McDonald as nominal Legation commander Bernstein states, “It would have been customary for the contingents to be commanded by the senior officer present. However, because of intense national rivalries, the fact that the senior officer present was the Japanese military attaché, Colonel Shiba, and senior European diplomats refused to serve under a Japanese.”

¹⁷Henry Keown-Boyd, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony* (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 157.

¹⁸The official report puts the total at 20,170 officers and men from all the nations prepared to make the advance on 4 August 1900. *Reports on Military Operations in South Africa and China* (Washington, D.C., July 1901), 567. However, H. B. Morse puts the number at 18,800, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, vol. 3, *The*

Period of Subjection, 1894-1911 (London: 1918), 268; and Aaron S. Daggett reports the number at 18,600, but states that this figure is too high, and “the effective force probably did not exceed 16,000 men,” *America in the China Relief Expedition* (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Co. 1903), 57. This figure (16,000) is probably the more accurate one in that the official report cited goes on to say, “On August 31, after ample time to get correct figures, Reuter’s Agency gives the numbers of the allied forces engaged in the relief expedition as: A total of 15,607 men and 112 guns” (568).

¹⁹General Chaffee’s orders from Secretary of War Root instructed him to “confer with the admiral in command of the naval forces of the United States on the Coast of China and it is expected that the two forces will . . . cooperate and assist each. . . . Chaffee, therefore, was not to lead a joint command, but would only direct the operations of U.S. land forces, relying on cooperative measures for his naval support.” James B. Agnew, “Coalition Warfare-Relieving the Peking Legations, 1900,” *Military Review* 56 no. 10 (October 1976): 66.

²⁰William J. Duiker, *Cultures in Collision* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 155.

²¹Ibid., 155.

²²The Japanese “suffered fairly heavy casualties--60 dead and an estimated 240 wounded.” Duiker, 156.

²³O’Connor, 223. In the Battle of Yang Tsun casualties amounted to 72 American, 45 British, and 118 Russian. Duiker, 157.

²⁴Beede, 46.

²⁵Beede, 46-47; and Keown-Boyd, 173-182.

²⁶This concise account of the military operations was compiled from numerous sources. There is an enormous bibliography on all aspects of Boxer Rebellion. Refer to the Selected Bibliography at the end of this thesis for a listing of some references.

²⁷That Chaffee was so directed reflected the McKinley administration’s concerns of being pushed into an anti-Chinese foreign alliance. Gary Murrell, “Perfection of Means, Confusion of Goals: The Military Career of Charles Henry Martin” (Ph.D. diss., Ann Arbor: UMI, 1995), 78, 89. Additionally, I believe that the command relationship parameters established for Chaffee may also have been due to the United States seeking increased legitimacy and respect as an equal among world power peers after the Spanish-American War. Therefore, an alliance or subordination to another power would not serve this end.

²⁸For example, Waite states, “The procedure followed in regulating the movements of the campaign was what one might call the ‘conference method.’ This system was based upon the fact that no officer, whatever his rank, could give orders to officers of any other army. A conference of commanders was held when necessary in order to determine the movements of the following day or days, and the majority ruled.” C. F. Waite et al., “Some Elements of International Military Cooperation” (Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1935), 9. For more information on the command arrangements and the council method utilized, the reader is referred to the following sources in the selected bibliography: Wilson’s *Middle Kingdom*; Chaffee’s *Official Reports*; Savage-Landor’s *China and the Allies*; C. F. Waite’s *Some Elements of International Military Cooperation*; and Agnew’s article, “Coalition Warfare: Relieving the Peking Legations,” 1900.

²⁹Waite, 28.

³⁰J. K. Taussig, “Experiences during the Boxer Rebellion,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 51 (April 1927): 410.

³¹For an interesting discussion on some of the foreign political dynamics of selecting von Waldersee as supreme commander of the International Force. See Ian Nish’s *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907*, 88-89; and Martin Kitchen’s *The German Officer Corps, 1890-1914*, 92-93; and *Russia in China* by Ralph Glatfelter, 91-93.

³²Waite, 16; and Harlow, 116.

³³Artillery support came from the British, American, Japanese, French, and Austrian contingents and included guns of various caliber. The bombardment at Tientsin started on 13 July at 5 a.m. and lasted until midday. The British guns alone fired 1,500 shells. Elbridge Colby, “Tientsin and the Boxer Rebellion,” *Military Engineer* 29, no. 165 (May-June 1937): 191-199.

³⁴Duiker, 167-172.

³⁵Waite, 9.

³⁶Savage-Landor, 128; Waite, 20; Harlow, 147, and 153-157; and Beede, 541.

³⁷Detailed information on these engagements are provided in the following sources: Savage-Landor, Waite, Daggett, and Colby as listed in the selected bibliography.

³⁸The following sources briefly mention liaison officers, mostly as a passing comment: Savage-Landor, Wilson, Daggett, Gausser, and Chaffee in his official report.

³⁹Harlow, 115-116.

⁴⁰These informational reports were later submitted to the Secretary of War as part of Chaffee's official report on the China Expedition. Chaffee did assign one officer in particular to work directly with General Sir Alfred Gaselee, commander of the British contingent, for "duty and observation, and as a medium of communications between the two generals during actual combats." Extracts from the *Report of Major General Adna R. Chaffee, on Military Operations in China* (Peking, 1900), 352-415, 435.

⁴¹General Chaffee mentions in his reports about one instance when a German officer was speaking to a French officer in French, while the Frenchman responded back in German. The bugle call system was adopted by the Seymour expedition to facilitate communications among the forces. For more information regarding language challenges during the campaign, see Chaffee's *Reports*, 499, 505; Colby, 198; and Waite, 35-36.

⁴²Colby relates the following anecdote that occurred at Tientsin, "direct instructions to Colonel Liscum of the 9th Infantry, General Fukushima did not give, and it was doubtful if he could have given them, for when the two met at the Hai-kwan-ssu or West Arsenal literally amid shot and shell, universal ignorance of one another's languages reduced the "conference" to a series of polite bows and smiles by both 'principals' and by their staffs" (p. 198).

⁴³Chaffee's *Reports*, 548.

⁴⁴John Hixson and Benjamin Franklin Cooling, *Combined Operations in Peace and War* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1982), 3.

⁴⁵Waite, 13; and Hixson, 5.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no cookbook approach to coalition warfare.¹

Robert W. Riscassi

The primary purpose of this thesis was to investigate and analyze how the U.S. Army conducted multinational operations during the China Relief Expedition of 1900. The secondary purpose was to ascertain any possible legacies the Boxer Rebellion experience might provide to the way the U.S. Army conducts multinational operations today. To answer these questions, this thesis covered a range of diverse topics all designed to provide the essential backdrop and framework to answer the above questions. These topics included: investigating the evolution and development of current U.S. Army multinational doctrine; examining the political dynamics that permeated in the world as they related to China in 1900; describing the nature of the U.S. Army going into China near the turn of the century; and finally, analyzing the Boxer campaign conducted through the tenets of current multinational doctrine.

Chapter 5 provided an overview of the Boxer campaign, and focused on the broad issues of how command, control, coordination, and liaison were accomplished. With all of the problems that beset the coalition in these areas the question becomes, “Why was it successful?” This study suggests two reasons: a common threat and a resolute unity of effort. Interoperability in the coalition remained greatest when the focus on accomplishing military objectives and the perception of a strong threat remained. As long as Peking remained the principal objective, coalition friction was at a minimum.

Once the legations were secured, Peking taken, and the Boxers subdued, cooperation between the coalition members rapidly deteriorated and interoperability waned. Thus, an examination of the campaign in the Boxer Rebellion illustrated that true coalition interoperability occurred when cooperation started at the top. Once the cooperative atmosphere prevailed at the higher command levels of the coalition then subordinates worked through all obstacles and challenges to accomplish the mission.²

Additionally in chapter 5, the reader was provided with a sense of the performance of U.S. participation in the operations of 1900. However, an assessment of the army's ability in performing those operations in China remains. In order to adequately assess the army and its role in China, several points must be considered. First, the army had no recent multinational experiences to draw upon when it deployed forces to China. Second, the U.S. forces assembled for the expedition, with the minor exception of some units in the Philippines, had not trained or conducted tactical missions before China. Third, the senior leaders of the expedition, Generals Chaffee and his assistant Wilson, were appointed to command a force they had neither led nor trained. In essence, leaders and units were thrown together as an ad hoc task force with little or no relevant experience to use as a guide for what they would encounter in China. Yet, in spite of these challenges the army accomplished all of its missions in China with a minimum of American casualties.³ If above conclusions are measures of success for the army today, then the China Relief Expedition did well. In sum, the ability of the U.S. Army to operate effectively with other powers was proven in the Boxer campaign, and its overall performance was satisfactory.

To answer the second purpose of the thesis, the army today should carefully consider lessons from the Boxer rebellion with reservation. It becomes difficult to make a direct connection to events that occurred one hundred years ago to military operations today. In the span of those hundred years too much changed for the army to draw specific legacies from the China Relief Expedition. There were, however, many relevant issues in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion, some immediate and others farreaching, that affected the army, the United States, and the world, as known today.

Because of the Boxer Rebellion, Japan emerged from the experience with enhanced national prestige. Like the United States, this was the first time Japanese troops fought alongside European armies, and they were quickly recognized as a well-trained military force. For the Russians, the Boxer experience provided the opportunity to build a powerful military presence in Manchuria. Ultimately, this buildup of forces and acquisition of territories in Asia would result in war between Russia and Japan in 1904. For China, the rebellion and foreign intervention further weakened the existing monarchy, and events in 1900 paved the way for the fall of the Manchu dynasty ten years later. Although the foreign intervention and subsequent occupation by foreign forces saved China from dismemberment, it would be well into the twentieth century before all foreign military presence departed. The Boxer movement also marked for China the emergence of mass nationalism that is still prevalent there today.⁴

Like Japan, the United States emerged with an enhanced reputation. The U.S. held its own militarily alongside new European peers. Diplomatically, the U.S. assisted in preserving the economic status quo, and after the events in China in 1900, the economic position of the United States in the Pacific rose in strength. As to the China

Relief Expedition, by October a token force remained to guard the legations, while the majority of the forces were sent back to the Philippines to fight insurrectos. The U.S. military commitment to China may have ended, but the Boxer Rebellion was the beginning of a moral commitment to China that would last well into the twentieth century.⁵

For the U.S. Army the legacy question of the Boxer Rebellion experience becomes: Did the army learn anything from its experiences in the Boxer war? Aside from the fact that the 1900 campaign experiences in China became part of the institutional memory of the army for a while, the answer is, yes it did, but in an indirect way. This indirect legacy was in the area of tactical doctrine development.

Andrew Birtle in his book, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941*, stated, “other than giving the Army some expeditionary experience and an opportunity to observe the workings of foreign armies, the Peking Relief Expedition had little impact on Army doctrine.”⁶ Birtle supports his argument by citing that American officers recognized the command, control, and logistics problems that plagued the Boxer coalition effort, and faults them for not developing a multinational doctrine.⁷ This is an unfair accusation because the army during this period had problems that were more pressing in the Philippines. The army was figuring out its overseas role, let alone an integrated combined arms service doctrine. In truth, the Boxer Rebellion did have an effect on army doctrine, but only at the tactical level.

In this regard, the “legacy” aspect of the China Relief Expedition was borne by the officers that served there and in particular by one important officer General Chaffee. After leaving China, he commanded in the Philippines as military governor and took

some of the lessons he learned there with him. Following the Philippines, he became the second Chief of Staff of the Army in 1904.⁸ Like most experiences, Chaffee's overseas service including the Boxer Rebellion, had some impact on the way he viewed the army and the course it would take in the future.

Just four months before Chaffee became Chief of Staff, the newly formed Army General Staff created a committee to review existing drill regulations and recommend change. The old tactical debate between open-order and close-order formations that started in the late nineteenth century continued. There was an additional tactical debate regarding the position of officers in the battle line. Some committee members advocated that officers remain behind the line, while others advocated they be in front. Some of the committee members served in the China Relief Expedition, and they were the ones recommending the forward positioning of officers in relation to the line. In fact, one committee member was Chaffee's aide-de-camp in China. Both recommendations were presented to Chaffee, who sided with his former aide.⁹ The indirect legacy of the Boxer Rebellion on the United States Army was that officers would lead from the front.

The follow-on question to the legacy of the Boxer Rebellion experience pertains to the army of the present. Has FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, captured the essence of coalition warfare when examined through this historical case study? The answer is yes. Much has been discussed regarding the four functional imperatives of command, control, coordination, and liaison. Synchronization of these functions is inhibited by all the disparities inherent to coalition operations: technology, doctrine, training, language, and others. To overcome these disparities and to enhance interoperability between forces, FM 100-8 places great emphasis on personal interactions

at all levels. In the final analysis, it is the human element that makes a coalition work. This was true in the Boxer Rebellion, and it remains true today. In that regard, FM 100-8 captured the “legacy” of coalition operations from 1900.

The purpose of this thesis was not to conduct an in-depth analysis of current Joint or U.S. Army doctrine regarding multinational operations, but rather to examine the Boxer Rebellion experience in the context of army imperatives for coalition warfare. However, during the course of the research on current doctrine (chapter 2) for this study, one overall weakness of army and Joint multinational doctrine became obvious. A review of FM 100-8, *The Army in Multinational Operations*, revealed that it is mostly a compilation of lessons learned instead of a “how-to fight” manual. Even the Joint publications are sketchy at best in this regard.

Multinational doctrine for the challenges of twenty-first-century warfare must encompass more than just pointing out that technological, force, and language disparities exist, but suggest ways to execute these missions. Doctrine for conducting multinational operations needs to be multinational doctrine, but what does this mean. In sum, doctrine needs to be developed on how to conduct and execute multinational operations, instead of a checklist of “dos and don’ts.” Future doctrine writers need to guide American officers in “communicating commander’s intent, battlefield missions, control measures, combined arms and joint procedures, and command relationships,” along with how to conduct campaign planning in a multinational environment.¹⁰ Doctrine structured in this manner will assist in alleviating the inherent disparities that will be ever present in future multinational operations.

In addition to doctrinal issues, additional issues were discovered that might warrant future research. The first area pertains to Elihu Root's *Addresses and Reports*, the issue of Executive Authority to send troops overseas without congressional approval was addressed in an Army Appropriations Bill debate in 1912. The specific example cited in the debate was President McKinley's decision to deploy forces to China in the Boxer Rebellion incident.¹¹ This passage could very well be the early origins of what evolved into the War Powers Act in later years. More research conducted in this area may prove this premise, or at least suggest the evolution of presidential decisions to use military force in the absence of a declared state of emergency.

Another issue involves the "psychology of sieges." In Bertram Simpson's (B. L. Putnam Weale's) book, *Indiscreet Letters From Peking*, he portrayed a somewhat skeptical and not too flattering perspective on the interactions and motivations of a population under siege. Simpson (Weale) was in the Peking Legations during the fifty-five-day ordeal in 1900, and wrote from his own first-hand observations.¹² Research in this area could examine other populations under siege for an extended period to ascertain if a unique "siege mentality" exists and if common trends emerge.

More research is needed regarding U.S.-coalition operations. Hopefully, this thesis can provide the basis for a broader work on multinational interventions in the twentieth century. A casebook examination of twentieth-century-multinational interventions that the U.S. participated in since the Boxer Rebellion may provide an overall perspective and assessment of U.S.-coalition warfare.

In conclusion, many issues emerged as a result of the army's participation in the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. Operations changed over time into various forms of warfare.

To their credit, China Relief Expedition members adjusted well to constantly changing and unanticipated situations, for “It was campaigning and combat without a declaration of war.”¹³ It was a complex quasi-joint operation, with naval elements not only providing artillery support, but also navy forces conducting ground operations as well. Combined ground operations shifted from open maneuver of conventional forces to MOUT (city fighting). Finally, operations shifted to some limited aspects of OOTW, such as peacekeeping, limited nation building, and occupation duty. Thus was the nature of the United States’ first land war in Asia.

¹Robert W. Riscassi, “Principles for Coalition Warfare,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (summer 1993): 59.

²Hixson, 9; and Harlow, 179.

³“American troops had suffered comparatively light losses--slightly more than 200 killed and wounded.” This was out of a force of about 2,000. *American Military History* (Center of Military History), 314.

⁴See Joseph W. Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), xiii; Henry Keown-Boyd, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony, A History of the Boxer Uprising in China in the Year 1900* (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), 243; William J. Duiker, *Cultures in Collision* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), 206; Ian Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894-1907* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976), 90; David Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914* (London: Methuen and Co., 1977), 173; Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japan Since Perry* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949), 283; and R. Ernest Dupuy and William H Baumer, *The Little Wars of the United States* (New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1968), 100.

⁵Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1998), 150; and Dupuy and Baumer, 122.

⁶Birtle, 150-151.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Birtle, 152-153; William Gardner Bell, *Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-1983* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1983), 994. Of note, two other officers that served with Chaffee in the China Relief Expedition were later Chiefs of Staff: Charles Pelot Summerall, 1926-1930, and Malin Craig, who served from 1935-1939. Bell. 114, 118.

⁹That officer was Captain Frank DeWitt Ramsay. Henry J. Ousterhuot, "The Evolution of U.S. Army Assault Tactics, 1778-1919: The Search for Sound Doctrine" (Ph.D. Diss., Duke University, 1986), 130-135.

¹⁰Riscassi, 60.

¹¹Part of the passage, dated 14 August 1912, reads, "In support of his amendment, Mr. Bacon said that the country had come to a stage where the Executive orders the army into foreign countries, without the authority of Congress, not only when Congress is not in session, but when Congress is in session, and without communicating the fact to Congress. He referred especially to the sending of troops into China during the Boxer War, and said that there was no communication sent to Congress at that time." Elihu Root, *Military and Colonial Policy of the United States, Addresses and Reports* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916), 157.


¹²Bertram L. Simpson (B. L. Putnam Weale), *Indiscreet Letters from Peking* (New York: Arno Press and the N.Y. Times (reproduced), 1970).

¹³Elbridge Colby, "Tientsin and the Boxer Rebellion," *Military Engineer* 29, no. 165 (May-June 1937): 191.


MAPS

1. North-East China
2. The Seymour Expedition
3. The Taking of the Taku Forts
4. The Defense of the Legation Quarter
5. The Battle of Tientsin
6. Route of the International Relief Expedition


(All maps were reproduced from, *The Fists of Righteous Harmony*, by Henry Keown-Boyd. London: Leo Cooper, 1991).




Map 1



Map 2




Map 3




Map 4

THE BATTLE OF TIENSIN

ASSAULT FORCES	
Japanese	↑
British	↓
French	↔
American	↔
Russian	↔



Map 5



Map 6

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